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This thesis is about the intellectual history of the modern debate on the public
domain and the question about ownership of information and culture through in-
tellectual property rights. The beginning of this debate is often said to be David
Lange’s 1981 article “Recognizing the Public Domain.” What Lange called for
was a recognition of individual rights in the public domain, also in cases where a
recognition like this would offset new intellectual property rights. Lange did not
provide a general theory on the public domain, and his article is perhaps better
understood as a makeshift criticism of the conventional intellectual property doc-
trine. Nevertheless, over the next twenty years the debate can be said to have
developed from a rudimentary critique of intellectual property to a positively de-
fined social theory of the value of a strong public domain and of openness in
society in general. It is this development — this academic history — I will try to
trace, analyse and categorise in this thesis.
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In March 2009, the Israeli artist Kutiman uploaded a music collage in eight move-
ments on the video publishing web site YouTube. Created entirely from other
videos posted on YouTube, Kutiman’s “Thru-you” is one of the first examples
of an art form that was inconceivable just a few years ago. At the same time it
raises a number of questions. Kutiman’s reuse is shamelessly blatant. Does that
make Kutiman a poacher, merely heisting other peoples property; or is reuse the
essence of all art, simply less conspicuous in other art forms?
Another example is Alice Randall’s novel The Wind Done Gone, which is a par-
ody of Margaret Mitchell’s more famous novel Gone with the Wind. Randall’s
remake is told from the perspective of Scarlett O’Hara’s mulatto half-sister Cy-
nara, who is a slave at Scarlett’s plantation. Before the book could be published,
however, the Mitchell estate sued Randall and her publishing company, and got
an injunction against publishing the book. Benkler: “In 2001, more than fifty
years after Margaret Mitchell died, and years after the original copyright for the
book would have expired under the law in effect when Mitchell wrote it, a federal
district judge ordered Randall’s publisher not to publish The Wind Done Gone.”1
Randall’s parody was ultimately published, but just as Kutiman’s mashup “Thru-
You,” the case raises important questions about cultural ownership. What parts
of the novel Gone with the Wind are unique enough to warrant the Mitchell es-
tate’s exclusive ownership? Can one write a book about a woman named Scar-
lett, or is that mere duplication of Mitchell’s work? What about write about family
life at a plantation in Georgia? Or about love? Arguably, it is impossible to write
a book that does not draw upon impulses from other authors. In the same way,
it is very hard to invent something without building upon what others have built
before. Or, as Isaac Newton put it, standing upon the shoulders of giants. An
extreme example is language. It is really hard to write a book that does not use
words other people have used before.
In terms derived from intellectual property law, these questions are related to
questions about what is in the “public domain,” and what is protected by in-
tellectual property rights like patents, copyright, trademark, etc. Over the last
few years we have seen a spike in the attention given to these issues. From
1Yochai Benkler, “Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the
Public Domain”, Law and Contemporary Problems 66, 2003, p. 173.
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the Napster lawsuit in 2001 to the Pirate Bay trial in 2009, public interest in
issues regarding cultural ownership has virtually exploded. Led on by partici-
patory web sites such as Wikipedia, Flickr, Facebook, MySpace, Twitter, Pirate
Bay, and, as mentioned, YouTube, a movement claiming a new take on creativity
has emerged. On one hand, this “free culture movement” is a “cultural environ-
mentalism,” a preservationist movement for the digital age. On the other hand, it
is a political movement claiming a reconfiguration of the laws relating to culture.
Behind this aesthetic and political movement is an analytic framework that was
developed in the 1980s and 1990s, especially by American copyright law schol-
ars. This debate or argument is characterised by its attempt to understand the
nature and role of public domain better. The substantive problem which pro-
vided the orientation for this study was therefore that of making intelligible what
appeared to be a recurring pattern of attitudes toward public domain and the
value of common access to knowledge and information on the part of American
law scholars in the 1980s and 1990s, and how this pattern spread into other
disciplines to form a social theory on public domain by the early to mid-2000s.
The intellectual history of this social theory has not been studied extensively,
and the few examinations that can be found are usually limited to the length of a
footnote or at most a few paragraphs in an introduction. From these limited treat-
ments, however, a general understanding of the typical take on this debate can
be inferred: The honour of beginning the debate is usually attributed to David
Lange’s prescient 1981 article “Recognizing the Public Domain.” Then noth-
ing much happened until Jessica Litman wrote “The Public Domain” in 1990,
which was followed by the work of people like L. Ray Patterson, Stanley W. Lind-
berg, Peter Jaszi, James Boyle, Jerome H. Reichman, Mark Rose, and Pamela
Samuelson. Some of these people, most notably Boyle, Litman, Lange, and
Samuelson, continued their work on the public domain into the 2000s, and were
joined by new people like Yochai Benkler, Lawrence Lessig, Siva Vaidhyanathan,
Debora J. Halbert, and Julie E. Cohen.
My argument is that the development of the use of the term “public domain” is
more complex than this. I agree that the debate began in 1981. Not because
Lange was the first to study the public domain, but because he seems to have
been the first to pay direct attention to it. Few, if any, focused solely on the
public domain before 1981. My main disagreement with the typical take on the
history of the modern debate on the public domain is that it fails to acknowledge
the “old” in all the “new.” This might seem strange, seeing that one of the most
common arguments within the debate is the recognition of inspiration and reuse.
3But the reason is not so much nonsensical inconsistency as shortness. There
is not much room in a few paragraphs. Still, a pinch more precision could have
been fitted into the same space. This is my suggestion:
David Lange’s 1981 article “Recognizing the Public Domain” is widely acknowl-
edged as the first article to study the public domain explicitly. Through the 1980s,
1990s and early 2000s, his approach was continued and expanded upon by (1)
detaching the public domain discourse from the discursive field of intellectual
property law, and (2) associating the public domain with a number of different
arguments related to information and knowledge. This embedding of the public
domain in, among others, information economics (Grossman and Stiglitz), insti-
tutional economics (Ronald Coase), aesthetics (Northrop Frye), political philoso-
phy (Ju¨rgen Habermas), and cultural anhropology (Lewis Hyde) vastly expanded
the scope and significance of the public domain discourse.
Taking this as my point of departure, my argument is that the concept of the
public domain, although it certainly existed in 1980, was reconstructed through-
out the eighties and nineties and placed squarely in the center of what I have
called a social theory on free culture and immaterial rights in the public domain.
Moreover, I believe Jonathan Lethem’s 2007 essay “The Ecstacy of Influence”
is emblematic of this new social theory. Compared to the discussions about the
public domain in the 1970s, Lethem’s essay is eloquent and persuasive almost
to a fault, and it rests upon a coherent and systematic study of the subject. The
essay could therefore be seen as the culmination of that which Northrop Frye
called the “consolidating progress which belongs to a science.”2 To Lethem,
culture is not authored by creative genius working in isolation. Rather, culture
is accumulative, and authoring has more to do with rearranging, reshaping and
rephrasing than solitary pioneering. Fittingly, Lethem used Mary Shelley’s words,
and wrote: “Invention, it must be humbly admitted, does not consist in creating
out of void but out of chaos.”3 Based on this, Lethem argued that the prerequisite
of culture — the sine qua non of creativity — is a strong public domain, and that
intellectual property should be subordinated to the right to reuse.
By tracing the development of the modern debate on the public domain, the
aim of this thesis is to interpret, analyse and categorise some of the founda-
tional ideas of a field and a politics I believe might become the most impor-
tant issue of the 21st century. The challenges related to information, knowl-
2Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism - Four Essays, (Princeton (NJ): Princeton University
Press, 1957), p. 8.
3Jonathan Lethem, “The ecstasy of influence - A plagiarism”, Harper’s Magazine 314, 2007,
p. 61.
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edge, privacy and the internet are, in my opinion, likely to define this century
as much as the French revolution defined the 18th, the industrial revolution de-
fined the 19th, and what can perhaps be labelled the “battle of ideologies” de-
fined the 20th. Phenomenons like Creative Commons, peer-to-peer file sharing,
Wikipedia, YouTube, Flickr, blogs, bioprospecting, and open source are only the
beginning of this revolution.
Before I begin my exposition of the modern debate on the public domain, I am
first going to discuss the theoretical approach of this thesis, and then briefly
sketch the outline of what is to come.
Theoretical Approach
Broadly speaking, one could argue that the subject of intellectual history is “what
people thought.” A sweeping definition like this encompasses an overwhelming
amount of thoughts, so I am going to narrow it down. The most important reason,
notwithstanding the impossibility of such a study, is that an idiosyncratic study of
all that has ever been thought is more or less useless. It is comparable to the
map that is a three dimensional replica in a 1:1 scale. To make sense of people’s
thoughts through history, it is necessary to generalise and make abstractions, as
well as categorise and sort these generalisations.
The kinds of generalisations and abstractions that are most relevant for the in-
tellectual history of the modern debate on the public domain, at least from the
point of view that I have chosen in this thesis, are different systems of thought,
ideologies and schools. In politics, for example, we have capitalism, fascism,
and socialism; in science we have constructivism, liberalism, and structuralism;
in art we have cubism, dadaism, and surrealism; and in religion we have agnos-
ticism, atheism, and gnosticism. There are also eponymous schools of thought,
like cartesianism, kantianism, and platonism. Espen Schaanning states that the
requirements for such a system are (1) that it is a collection of elements ordered
into an organised whole, and (2) that it is coherent (i.e. reasonable and con-
sistent).4 In this chapter, I will discuss these requirements and describe three
4Espen Schaanning, Fortiden i va˚re hender - Foucalt som vitensha˚ndtør , (Oslo: Unipub,
2000) , vol. 1, p. 22.
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different kinds of systems of thought, as well as consider a simple theory about
associated systems of thought within different frames of references.
Systems of Thought
According to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, most systems of thought like
these are discourses. A discourse is an attempt to fix words and concepts and
how these are related to one another as moments of a structured totality. As a
result of this, the discourses are not merely a post hoc attempt to make sense of
people’s thoughts through history, but, rather, an articulation created by the par-
ticipants themselves. The discourses should be seen as a way of organising the
multitude of meaning that came into existence with the Weberian disenchant-
ment of the world. Thus, the elements can be seen as fragments of a lost unity,
as opposed to the “natural organic unity peculiar to Greek culture.”5 In addition
to this, however, a discourse is characterised by restraining the participants and
limiting their options. An attempt to fix meaning as moments of a structured
totality is, by definition, a restriction and a removal of options. As such, a dis-
course disciplines its participants with regard to the use of concepts and their
relationship.6
That being the case, a discourse can be said to be an “unintentionally created
system of thought.” This is a system of thought in which the participants unin-
tentionally articulates the meaning and relation of certain words and concepts.
For example, there exist a specific vocabulary and a certain set of conventions
regarding the use of this vocabulary in the context of childhood. In this context,
words like parent, responsibility, and safety have a fixed meaning. They are the
junctions and intersections — in discourse analysis called nodal points — of the
childhood discourse, and all other meaning in the context of childhood revolve
around them. This is also the case in the context of fashion (where beauty,
trends, and money are some of the nodal points), and in the context of financial
markets (where risk, credit rating and interest are among the nodal points).
In addition to the unintentionally created systems of thought, however, it is pos-
sible to argue that there exists “intentionally created systems of thought.” These
are similar to the unintentionally created systems of thought in that they try to
fix meaning as moments of a structured totality. But, contrary to the uninten-
tionally created systems, the intentionally created systems are not discourses in
5Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony & Socialist Strategy - Toward a Radical
Democratic Politics, (London: Verso, 1985), p. 94.
6Ibid., pp. 96,105.
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themselves. Not because they are intentional, but, rather, because they do not
discipline their participants in the way a discourse does. This does not mean that
intentionally created systems of thought can not influence a discourse, or that
they do not exist in the same social space. But before I discuss this influence
and interconnectedness I will describe the different kinds of intentionally created
systems of thought.
There exists two basic kinds of intentionally created systems of thought. The
first is an explicit description of a discourse — an “exposition.” The reason this
is an intentionally created system of thought, and not just a description of the
discourse, is that the exposition never can be completely accurate. Even if the
exposition was perfect (which is virtually impossible), it would still not reflect the
original discourse because the description would be frozen in time while the
discourse matures and adapts continually. Using Boyle’s words, the discourse
could perhaps be described as “an ever-changing scene which folds back onto it-
self like a Mo¨bius strip.”7 Also, an exposition cannot discipline its participants. As
a result, an intentionally created system of thought is “inactive” or “dead,” at least
compared to a discourse which by definition is lively and active. Two examples
might explain this better. First, there existed a certain kind of mathematics that
analysed phenomena as “games” before John von Neumann coined the term
“game theory” and described this as a system of thought in 1944. Von Neu-
mann’s “game theory” was the exposition of the game discourse. Second, there
existed a framework of understanding – a discourse — based on the beneficial
effects of privatisation and liberalisation before John Williamson coined the term
“Washington Consensus” and detailed its inner workings in 1989. Williamson’s
“Washington Consensus” was the exposition of the neo-liberal discourse.
The second kind of intentionally created systems of thought shares most of the
properties of the exposition (i.e. frozen and non-disciplinary), but differs in its
origins. The second kind is not meant as a description of an existing system
of thought, but rather an attempt at formulating a “tenet” or a “set of principles.”
This means that this kind of system of thought is normative. The first example
that comes to mind is a manifesto. One rather obvious example is the Com-
munist Manifesto, which is an intentionally created system of thought, but not a
discourse.
As mentioned, this does not mean that unintentionally and intentionally created
systems of thought — discourses, expositions and tenets — are not related and
7James Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens, (Cambridge (MA): Harvard University
Press, 1996), p. 27.
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do not exist in the same social sphere. On the contrary, both expositions and
tenets can exist within a discourse. Von Neumann’s description of the game
discourse most likely did influence the discourse on games, even though the ex-
position was not a discourse itself. The same applies to Williamson’s exposition
of the neo-liberal discourse. Furthermore, it often happens that the participants
in a debate following the publication of a manifesto creates a new discourse.
This discourse is related to the manifesto, but it is the discourse that disciplines
its participants, not the manifesto. The Communist Manifesto is a good exam-
ple of this. The manifesto is clearly normative, which makes it a tenet or a set
of principles. On the other hand, communism, at least in a general sense, is a
discourse, while an intellectual history of marxism is an exposition.
By saying this, I acknowledge that these systems of thought are not “given” in
the sense of being a “platonic idea.” On the contrary, each system is either an
articulation of meaning as an attempt to make sense of the world, in the case
of discourses and tenets; or theoretical models we employ to make sense of
human thought, in the case of expositions.
Therefore, some of the tasks of the intellectual historian — at least when writing
about systems of thought — is (1) to uncover historical systems of thought that
people have unconsciously adhered to (i.e. without realising it), (2) to try to
reveal the inconsistency and irrationality of “unreasonable” systems of thought
through a historical comparison of these systems, and (3) to study the continuity
of a tradition as well as historically trace the elements constituting a system
of thought. The second point is meant in a manner reminiscent of Quention
Skinner, when he states that “the explanatory problem must always be that of
accounting for a lapse of rationality.”8
The rationale behind this is that such systems control, or at least strongly in-
fluence, the conclusions we reach. A system we unconsciously adhere to, or
a system that is incoherent and irrational, may distort our understanding of the
world. Accordingly, disclosing historical systems of thought might help us un-
derstand more about historical events and the choices people have made in the
past.
To uncover and describe historical systems of thought, however, entails the cre-
ation of an exposition. The reason, as mentioned above, is that it is nearly
impossible to make a correct description of a discourse. As a result, one could
argue that the whole endeavor is futile, and that any attempt at a description
8Quentin Skinner, Vision of Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) , vol. 1,
p. 31.
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of a historical system of thought has no purpose. In most cases, however, the
distortion is too small to corrupt the main dynamic of the system, and the con-
clusions drawn from the approximate description of the system will be the same
conclusions that would have been drawn from a perfect description of the sys-
tem. What I mean by this is that the exposition created by the historian — at
least with a carefully worked out description — will be sufficiently similar to the
original discourse for its conclusions to be valid. Having said that, it is still impor-
tant to remember that any description of a discourse is still just an approximate
description, and that this description is not the discourse itself, but a separate
exposition. Additionally, it is important to recognise that deviations can come
into existence not only through incidental human error, but also through inten-
tional maladaptation. Proponents of certain views may, for instance, persistently
overestimate the coherence and soundness of the system of thought that sup-
ports their views, and underestimate the appropriateness of a system that goes
against their views.
This description of a system of thought as a coherent collection of elements into
an organised whole takes no notice of the fundamental norms and premises of
the system. This means that a system of thought exist entirely within one frame
of references or one set of norms. In my thesis, I will at talk about common
sense, which we recognise from the Copyright Clause in the United States Con-
stitution and has as its goal a general usefulness to society; economics, with a
keener set of premises on which to build an argument; aesthetics, which is an
approach that comes from within the field of arts and sciences, and thus uses the
premises of the arts and sciences themselves to argue about what is good and
efficient; politics, which is about the choices we have to take as a society; and
moral, which is based on moral philosophy and tends to argue that something is
right, wrong or in a morally gray area.
In general, one could argue that the more frames of references an ideology or
a politics adheres to, the more reliable and convincing it is. According to Peter
Jaszi, for instance, scholars sometimes fail to recognise a “foundational concept
for what it is—a culturally, politically, economically, and socially constructed cat-
egory rather than a real or natural one.”9 As such, it is often at the confluence
of several frames of references that meaning is created. Martha Woodmansee,
for example, argues that the concepts and principles central to authorship and
copyright achieved their modern form “precisely in the interplay of the [...] le-
9Peter Jaszi, “Toward a Theory of Copyright - The Metamorphoses of ”Authorship””, Duke
Law Journal , 1991, p. 459.
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gal, economic, and social questions on the one hand and the philosophical and
esthetic on the other.”10
My argument is that a combination of different systems of thought, in which each
subsidiary system of thought adheres to individual frames of references, can be
of the same three kinds as the individual systems of thought. Such a complex
of systems of thought (from now on just complex, for simplicity) can either be
intentionally or unintentionally created. And, if it is intentionally created, it can
either be normative or descriptive. Because my subject is the study of human
societies, I am going to call the descriptive intentionally created complex a social
theory. Moreover, I will call the normative intentionally created complex either a
politics or an ideology. The unintentionally created complex is in many ways still
a discourse, even though it is a composite discourse. This composite discourse
is a discursive field. A small table may clarify:
Unintentional Intentional Intentional
Simple Discourse Tenet Exposition
Complex Discursive Field Politics Social theory
Based on this terminology, it can be argued that a group of systems of thought
is a complex when it has a rather coherent argument within several of the differ-
ent frames of references. For example, I would say that the mesh of meaning
Williamson labelled the “Washington Consensus” is a basic system of thought,
or a discourse, when it consists of arguments on the efficiency of a specific eco-
nomic approach toward developing countries; and that it expands into a complex,
or a discursive field, when it incorporates arguments about the moral “rightness”
of alleviating poverty through liberalisation, the political aptness of privatisation,
as well as the legal appropriateness of these strategies. This is also true for the
mesh of meaning related to the modern debate on the public domain. It is a
discourse when it only consists of legal arguments, and a discursive field when
it incorporates economic, aesthetic, political, and anthropological arguments.
Moreover, the collection of expositions amounts to a social theory when they
have the same complexity as the discursive field. Finally, a collection of tenets
or sets of principles amounts to a politics or an ideology when they maintain a
relatively coherent argument encompassing several frames of references.
10Martha Woodmansee, “The Genius and the Copyright”, Eighteenth-Century Studies 17,
1984, p. 440.
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Terminology
The difference between the public domain and commons can often be a bit dif-
ficult to understand, and many times the terms are used interchangebly. The
terms derive from its use in intellectual property law, however, and most of the
time, public domain usually refers to knowledge, information, and “culture” free
for all to use at their own discretion. Or, more eloquently put, free as air to com-
mon use. Prominent examples are knowledge of how to use a wheel, how to
boil water on the hearth, the boilerplate Hollywood love story (man and woman
meet, fall in love, gets into a fight, cries, gets back together, and lives happily
until the end of the rolling titles), adding, subtracting, multiplying and dividing, as
well as the words “no,” “man,” “is,” “an,” and “island.”
Commons, on the other hand, usually refers to what is either in the public domain
or privately owned but available to all through licences. The essence of the
commons is that everyone should have equal access, and that nobody has the
right to stop others from using it. Therefore, if access is regulated, it has to be
regulated equally for everyone. This is what constitutes the cultural — or creative
— commons, something that is available to all.
In this thesis I am going to distinguish, at least to a certain degree, between the
terms “public domain” and “the public domain.” “The public domain,” with definite
article, is the legally defined notion of knowledge and information not protected
by copyright or patent law; while “public domain,” without definite article, is a
more general notion of knowledge and information free for all to use at their own
discretion. This means that “public domain” is a wider term encompassing both
“the public domain” and several kinds of commons.
A noteworthy aspect of the intellectual history of the public domain is how difficult
the lack of “property-less” terminology has made it to talk positively about the
public domain. As Boyle argued in his introduction to a panel discussion at
Google’s Zeitgeist 2008, we have a bias toward the enclosed.11. Why else would
Robinson Crusoe build a fence on a deserted island? Eva Hemmungs Wirte´n
writes: “Even when there is nobody there to keep out, nobody for whom the
fence means anything, it makes sense of the island, which without it is just horror
vacui, a ’negative space ... in search of a possessive content.”’12 This bias is
11Boyle, James. Google Zeitgeist 2008. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FzsjRuRO9As
(May 11, 2009)
12Eva Hemmungs Wirte´n, Terms of Use - Negotiating the Jungle of the Intellectual Commons,
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), p. 24, and Wolfram Schmidgen in ibid., p. 24.
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reflected in the English language itself. The most obvious example being the
“public domain” itself.
It could be argued that it is more or less counterintuitive to use the term “public
domain” to describe “that which is free for all to use at their own discression,”
because “domain” indicates that it is owned by someone. The reason we use
it is probably the strong metaphorical connection it has to the physical public
domain. According to Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, the physical public
domain is “land owned directly by the government,” while the immaterial public
domain is “the realm embracing property rights that belong to the community at
large, are unprotected by copyright or patent, and are subject to appropriation
by anyone.”13 What is conspicuous is how the term we use to describe this phe-
nomenon implies ownership in some way or another, even though the definition
of it does not. Furthermore, the terminological semblance of the two kinds of
public domain gives the impression that there is a strong conceptual connec-
tion between the two. Identifying the two as merely the material and immaterial
part of the same public domain, however, conceals the fact that there are larger
differences.
The fact that land is material makes it exhaustible. This is contrary to the im-
material public domain, which is inexhaustible. In economics, this distinction
is usually described through the dichotomy of rival and nonrival goods. That a
good is rival means that my use of it diminishes your use of it. If I eat an apple,
for example, you cannot eat it as well. An apple is therefore rival. But if I look
at the stars, you can look at the stars too. My use of the stars as a beautiful
scenery does not diminish your use. The celestial body is therefore nonrival.
In addition to the rival-nonrival dichotomy, economists often distinguish between
goods that are excludable and non-excludable. That a good is excludable means
that it is possible to exclude someone from using it. If I occupy a piece of land, for
example, it is taken, and I exclude you. Because of this, many people, or perhaps
even most people, agree that land must be owned in one way or another. This
consensus is so strong that public domain in its land sense by definition is owned
by the government.
Moreover, most rival goods are excludable, at least in a strict sense. Fish stocks
in international waters, for example, are rival, but it is just about impossible to
exclude fishermen (you could also add water and air to this list of rival and non-
excludable goods). As a corollary to this one would perhaps expect most nonri-
13Merriam Webster Online Dictionary s.v. “Public Domain.” [December 11, 2008]
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val goods to be non-excludable. And this is often the case. Nonrival goods like
national defense, radio and TV that is “telecast” and not “cablecast,” street lights,
clean air, and lighthouses are not excludable. At the same time, there exists a
number of nonrival goods that are excludable. Cable television is still the prime
example, but encryption technology has made it more and more feasible to sell
individual access to broadcasts. This is also true for web sites. Web sites are
non-rival because my use of a web site does not diminish your use (at least as
long as server bandwidth is not an issue), but a person can easily be excluded
from a web site by adding password protection.
Knowledge and information are the quintessential nonrival goods, at least if we
dodge the issue of lessening of value through sharing (“I don’t take anything
from you when I copy the way you dress,”14 writes Lawrence Lessig, but if I do,
you might have to get a new dress to be fashionable again). I could continue by
arguing that knowledge and information are the quintessential non-excludable
goods, but that would be ill-considered. If you have information, it is up to you to
decide whether you wish to disclose it or not. In sum, knowledge and information
are non-rival because my use will not diminish your use, and it is excludable as
long as it has not been disclosed. In addition to this, knowledge and information
can be excludable through social policies like immaterial property rights. Knowl-
edge and information in the public domain, on the other hand, are both nonrival
and non-excludable
Outline
The subject matter of this thesis is the intellectual history of the debate on the
public domain from David Lange’s 1981 article “Recognizing the Public Domain”
to Jonathan Lethem’s 2007 essay “The Ecstacy of Influence.” My argument is
that the term “public domain” was developed from being a subsidiary concept
within intellectual property law in 1981 to the core element of a comprehensive
social theory on free culture and immaterial rights in 2007, and my aim is to
describe, analyse, and “make intelligible” this development.
14Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture, (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), p. 84.
Outline 13
Originally, the idea of the public domain was, as Debora J. Halbert points out,
“woven into the fabric of copyright and patent law.” This corresponds to the fact
that the nature and role of the public domain was mostly, if not exclusively, dis-
cussed within the context of intellectual property law in the 1970s. As such,
the social theory on public domain was created by separating the public do-
main from the intellectual property discourse, embedding the concept into other
discourses related to information and knowledge, and — building on what had
been acquired from these other discourses — reconceptualising the argument
to fit into the greater theme of free culture and immaterial rights. In Halbert’s
words, the public domain needed to be “reinvigorated in order to serve a larger
public purpose.”15
Granted that Lange’s 1981 article “Recognizing the Public Domain” was the be-
ginning of the modern debate on the public domain, the contributions can broadly
be categorised into four phases: emergence, deconstruction, anchoring, and re-
alisation. There are no watersheds in the intellectual history of the public do-
main, however, and each phase seems to have blended almost seamlessly into
the next. Moreover, anchoring and realisation are so intertwined that they could
just as well be seen as the two main elements in a composite period of recon-
struction. Having said that, it is also clear that a number of the contributions
to the debate, and most of the contributions I have chosen to write about, can
be accurately placed within one of these phases. The structure of this thesis is
therefore based on this broad categorisation.
In Part I, which I have called “Discovering the Public Domain,” I will write about
the emergence of the modern debate on the public domain. Lange’s 1981 article
“Recognizing the Public Domain” was not entirely novel, however. In fact, it can
be argued that most of his analysis were similar to analyses put forward in the
copyright revision bill debate in the 1960s and 1970s, or, possibly, even earlier.
In retrospect it seems clear that Lange’s article did change something, however,
and that Lange’s article therefore should be seen as the beginning of a new
public domain discourse. As such, Part I is an examination of the novelties of
Lange’s article, and a comparison of his argument (1) to earlier views of the
public domain and (2) to the general political trends of the 1980s and 1990s.
In Part II, which I have called “Criticising the Notions of Intellectual Property,”
I will write about different attempts to reveal and deconstruct notions and illu-
sions regarding intellectual property. In this deconstructive phase, notions like
the “romantic notion of authorship” and the “labour justification of property” were
15Debora J. Halbert, Resisting Intellectual Property , (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 16.
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seen as blocking a true understanding of the nature and role of the public do-
main. The attempt was to detach the concept “public domain” from copyright and
patent discourses through a public domain-based critique of intellectual property
law. It is somewhat like the teenager’s detachment from her parents, trying to
“find herself.”
In Part III, which I have called “Replacing the Scaffolding and Falsework,” I will
write about attempts to moor the public domain debate to other theoretical frame-
works. New concepts were embedded into the debate by anchoring their use
of the concepts to the external discourses the concepts originated in. Exam-
ples include the anthropological study of gift exchange, institutional economics
and theories on production processes, and analyses of the value of a public
sphere to a democracy. In the analogy, the teenager would no longer be a
teenager, but in her twenties, searching for her roots. Contrary to the decon-
structive phase, where the typical focus is on the dismantling of what is seen as
confusing and even misleading notions, the typical contribution belonging to the
anchoring phase is a positive and constructive attempt to create a social theory
on the public domain.
In Part IV, which I have called “Appreciating Tinkering,” I will write about the re-
alisation of some of the potential created through deconstruction and anchoring.
This phase is therefore characterised by several attempts to create a compre-
hensive system of thought — a social theory on public domain — that might
help us understand the nature and role of the public domain. In addition to these
descriptive attempts, however, this phase also saw endeavors to create com-
prehensive, normative arguments that would be better described by words like
philosophy or ideology. The typical view of the public domain was as an essen-
tial component of society itself. Without a strong public domain, the argument
goes, we are shut out of the culture we belong to. And without a right to imitate,
plagiarise, criticise and satirise, we are at a loss as a society. The question is
therefore not whether the creator is able to create or not, but what kind of so-
ciety is being created. Tinkering with culture — e.g. by way of playing around
with a camcorder, discussing politics with your friends, or writing a satire on an
old book — is important because of the kind of society it enables, and the public
domain is a prerequisite of this tinkering.
As I mentioned in the introduction, the typical take on the intellectual history
of the modern debate on the public domain is generally assigned to a footnote
or at most a few paragraphs in an introduction. A few articles and books do
discuss the history somewhat more detailed, like Julie E. Cohen’s “Copyright,
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Commodification, and Culture,”16 David Bollier’s “Viral Spiral,”17 and Debora J.
Halbert’s “Resisting Intellectual Property,”18 but even these are far from treating
the intellectual history of the modern debate on the public domain as a historical
subject in its own right. There actually seems to have been no extended treat-
ments of the historical aspects of the debate. This certainly inspires a certain
degree of humility, and my treatment of the subject will undoubtedly be revised
and amended in the coming years — due, not least, to the fact that a rather brief
study like this can only reach so far in terms of sources.
It is therefore not without reason that I write “contributions” and not “the contribu-
tions” above. Even though my subject arguably is rather small — the intellectual
history of the modern debate of the public domain — the scope of this thesis is
still too little to cover an extensive analysis of “everything.” As a result of this, I
have decided to focus on a few key contributions rather than attempting to make
an exhaustive list of all that has been said about the public domain through three
decades. This has the added benefit of making it possible to undertake an ex-
tensive analysis of the contributions I do engage in. Moreover, it is clear that a
study of a subject like this, however narrow the subject is in itself, is bound to be
limited by the overwhelming amount of background material available. A large
part of the development of the modern debate on the public domain was, after all,
attempts to anchor the notion of public domain to other analytical frameworks.
To be able to describe the public domain debate at all, I have included short
descriptions of these other analytical frameworks, but limited these treatments
as much as can be justified.
The question that remains to be addressed is how the key contributions are
selected. My first answer to this question has to do with “belonging.” It can be
argued that an article or a book “belongs” more to one discourse than to another.
As such, I could claim that none of the earlier contributions “belonged” to a public
domain discourse as much as they belonged to a copyright discourse, an own-
ership discourse, etc. This distinction is important. On one hand, there exists a
number of contributions that “belong” to separate discourses but has elements
that are relevant for the public domain discourse. On the other hand, there ex-
ists some contributions that “belong” to the modern debate on the public domain.
For example, Jessica Litman’s 1990 article “The Public Domain,” James Boyle’s
1997 book “Shamans, Software, and Spleens,” Lawrence Lessig’s 2004 book
16Julie E. Cohen, “Copyright, Commodification, and Culture”. In: The Future of the Public Do-
main - Identifying the Commons in Information Law , ed. by Lucie Guibault og P. Bernt Hugen-
holtz, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2006, pp. 121–166.
17David Bollier, Viral Spiral , (New York: The New Press, 2008).
18Halbert, Resisting Intellectual Property .
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“Free Culture,” and Jonathan Lethem’s 2007 essay “The Ecstasy of Influence,”
are contributions that can be said to “belong” to the public domain discourse, or,
at least, belongmore to the public domain discourse than to any other discourse.
My second answer to the question of selection is “importance.” Importance is a
rather vague quality, and, statistical analyses of how often an article has been
cited notwithstanding, bound to be subjective. I have chosen to focus on books
and articles that I hold to be important based on what other people write about
them, how other people reference them, and the connection between their argu-
ment and the debate as a the whole.
The last answer to the question of selection is “arbitrariness.” At least to a certain
degree, I must acknowledge that the selection of books and articles I have come
across is arbitrary. Still, the debate I write about must by definition be the debate
comprised by the books and articles I discuss. What is more relevant is the
self-referential nature of a group of scholars, and the lock-in effect it may create.
I have chosen to focus mainly on academic contributions of Anglo-American
scholars, which causes me to have a bias toward peer-reviewed articles and
proceedings from academic conferences. Arguably, these scholars also have a
bias toward such articles and proceedings. And as one of the main approaches
to discover other contributions within a discursive field is to look up the cited
works, the self-referential nature of a group of scholars might create a lock-in
effect limiting the options of which books and articles to select.
Moreover, most scholars can, at least to a certain extent, be criticised for having
an easier time citing scholars who agree than scholars who disagree. I suspect
that I will also be liable to such critique. This phenomenon can easily add to the
lock-in effect discussed above and further limit the number of books and articles
that are available to be selected at all. Uncovering tendencies like this is an
important aspect of the intellectual history of a debate.
Also, people tend to write about subjects which are interesting to them. My thesis
is no exception from this. As such, of all the participants in a debate, a majority
is likely to have a special interest in the topic. This at least seems to be true for
debates about subjects like the public domain. People who have no interest in
the public domain tend to spend their time doing other things. My choice to write
about the intellectual history of the modern debate on the public domain, and
not the intellectual history about the debate on the public domain vs. copyright,
has left me with only a few articles disapproving of the public domain itself. I
could find more if I extended my subject to include copyright to a larger degree
than I already do, but I have chosen to focus on the debate on the public do-
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main. Rather obvious, but still crucial enough to state clearly, the overwhelming
enthusiasm toward the public domain one is met with in studying the intellectual
history of the subject is not necessarily representative of the general situation
of the 1980s and 1990s. The enthusiasm is representative of the participants in
the debate on the public domain.
Part I
EMERGENCE
Discovering the Public Domain
In 1981, Lange wrote: “Recognition of new intellectual property interests should
be offset today by equally deliberate recognition of individual rights in the pub-
lic domain.”19 Criticising the intellectual property regime was not unusual for an
American intellectual property law professor at that time, but Lange arguably did
more than just criticise intellectual property law. In fact, Lange claimed that the
privatisation of the public domain threathened both our cultural heritage and the
“rich promise of works to come.” By doing this, he initiated a public domain dis-
course within the larger discursive field of American intellectual property law.20
Nonetheless, his contribution was not profoundly innovative. His article “Rec-
ognizing the Public Domain” depended greatly on earlier criticism of intellectual
property law. Rather than being the first significant advocate of the public do-
main, it could just as easily be argued that Lange was nothing more than one of
a number of critics of intellectual property — although one that leaned heavily
toward the public domain. In fact, a large part of Lange’s article is conceptu-
ally similar to earlier articles written by people like William Krasilovsky, Benjamin
Kaplan, and Stephen Breyer. As I will discuss later, the contributions belonging
to this first phase of the debate were more or less confined to a jurisprudential
frame of reference and intellectual property law. The first thing I will analyse in
this part is therefore the connection between Lange’s article and some of the
previous criticism of intellectual property law.
19David Lange, “Recognizing the Public Domain”, Law and Contemporary Problems 44, 1981,
p. 147.
20See, among others, Jessica Litman, “The Public Domain”, Emory Law Journal 39, 1990,
Edward Samuels, “The Public Domain in Copyright Law”, Journal of the Copyright Society 41,
1993, James Boyle, “The Second Enclosure Movement”, Law and Contemporary Problems 66,
2003.
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The Revision Bill Debate
What I have called the revision bill debate is the scholarly debate related to the
prolonged negotiation about suggested copyright revision bills in USA, which
was finally enacted with the 1976 General Copyright Revision. Not having been
updated or revised since the Copyright Act of 1909, the argument was that Amer-
ican copyright law was outdated and out of touch with reality. According to Ka-
plan the 1960s were characterised by a widespread consent that something had
to be done to American copyright law:
As a veteran listener at many lectures by copyright specialists over the past
decade, I know it is almost obligatory for a speaker to begin by invoking
the “communications revolution” of our time, then to pronounce upon the
inadequacies of the present copyright act, and finally to encourage all hands
to cooperate in getting a Revision Bill passed.21
The sad tale of cruel forfeitures (annulment of an author’s copyright due to lack
of proper copyright notice) and the desire to join the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works did certainly not diminish the push for
copyright revision, but the dramatic changes in the technological landscape —
the communications revolution — was probably a lot more important. Since
1909, inventions ranging from Pe´ter Ka´roly Goldmark’s vinyl phonograph, the
Technicolor processes for adding color to movies, computers, the magnetic tape,
the compact cassette, the videocassette recorder, valve and transistor radio, as
well as the TV, had turned the media world upside down. The fact that Hollywood
was nothing but a small village just outside of Los Angeles in 1909 puts things
into perspective.
One of the most important innnovations in connection with copyright, however,
was the invention of the Xerox photocopier in 1959. Calls for copyright revision
would certainly have been made even in the absence of the photocopier, but
they would not have sparked the same debate. The distinctive feature of the
revision bill debate, separating it from all previous debates on copyright, was
the way it involved what we might call “consumer” technologies — technologies
21Benjamin Kaplan, “An Unhurried View of Copyright”. In: An Unhurried View of Copyright,
Republished (And With Contributions From Friends), ed. by Iris C. Geik and et al., Newark:
LexisNexis Matthew Bender, 2005, p. 1.
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intended for widespread adoption. The most important of these technologies
was the photocopier, even though some of the recording equipment also were
intended for private use.
What the photocopier did was to challenge the traditional separation of idea
and expression in copyright law. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
it was fairly easy to separate the idea (the content) from the expression (the
book) because you had to have a large printing press in order to print a book. It
was hard, as Lawrence Lessig has argued, to violate intellectual property law.22
The copier, however, made copyright infringement a commonplace. As early as
1967, Kaplan argued that some of the suggestions for a revision bill would “leave
a sizable fraction of the population [...] thus uncertainly subject to civil and even
criminal liability for acts now as habitual to them as a shave in the morning.”23
Kaplan’s quote illustrates how important the photocopier was to the revision bill
debate for two reasons. In the eyes of the proponents of stronger intellectual
property rights, copying was endemic. The pervasiveness of the photocopier
had made it more difficult to keep copyright infringement in check. In the eyes of
the opponents of stronger intellectual property rights, on the other hand, copying
was abounding. The photocopier had introduced new ways to use and perhaps
even enjoy different kinds of paper-based information and knowledge. “Schol-
ars, teachers, and librarians of course insist on this copying as essential to their
work,” Kaplan wrote, because “[m]achine copying of texts is getting progressively
easier and cheaper; and it can be done privately, without attracting much atten-
tion to itself.”24 This analytical dichotomy — in which technology is not assessed
based on what it actually does but whether it (1) increases the likelyhood of copy-
right infringement or (2) supplements people’s potential use of information and
knowledge — is characteristic for the whole debate on the public domain.
In the following, I am going to look at three distinct arguments presented by
copyright critics participating in the revision bill debate, and then compare these
to Lange’s 1981 article “Recognizing the Public Domain.” The first argument
focuses on utility, and is based on a commonsensial approach. The second
argument is based on a simple economic approach, questioning the validity of
intellectual property rights. The third is a rights-based approach, discussing the
existence of a common right to access information and knowledge.
22Lessig, Free Culture, p. 50.
23Kaplan, “An Unhurried View of Copyright”, p. 102.
24Ibid., p. 101.
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1. The Commonsensical Approach
The most serious contender for the position Lange’s article is presumed to have
— i.e. the “article that initiated the modern debate on the public domain” — is
William M. Krasilovsky’s 1967 article “Observations on Public Domain.” Krasilov-
sky’s main proposal was to establish “an office of Commissioner of Public Do-
main in Science and the Useful Arts.” The task of this office should be to cat-
alogue available public domain items, and to promote the use of such works.25
This suggestion is inspired by the practices in the “analogous public domain ar-
eas of fish and wildlife, public lands and minerals.” For, Krasilovsky argues, “in
each of these areas, appropriate government offices make regular surveys of the
public domain, promulgate information concerning its availability and generally
encourage orderly and efficient use for public benefit.”26
What is clear from this quote is that Krasilovsky views the public domain as
something that should be used. To Krasilovsky, however, the expansions of
copyright was not a threat to the public domain. In fact, Krasilovsky did not argue
expliticly for the protection of the public domain at all. What he did acknowledge,
however, was the usefulness of access to old material, a view he shared with
Stephen Breyer: “Yet to facilitate the copying of old writings is particularly impor-
tant, for an old writing that someone wishes to copy is likely to have unique merit
or to be needed for research or education.”27
Contrary to Krasilovsky, this understanding of the value of that which is freely
available prompted Breyer and Kaplan to oppose the proposed copyright exten-
sions. Not, however, because they were convinced it would be bad. To Breyer,
it was because it seemed “probable” that the harm an extension caused would
be worse than the benefits;28 to Kaplan, it was because the case for extension
was not convincing enough. It was strange, argued Kaplan, to argue for an
expansion of copyright in a society “in which nearly all else is moving and obso-
lescing at an accelerating pace, in which businessmen are rarely moved by any
but quick-return prospects.”29
Despite the fact that they did not argue within the same domain — Krasilovsky
argued that the public domain should be available and used, Breyer and Kaplan
argued that copyright should be limited — their reasoning shares the quality
25M. William Krasilovsky, “Observations on the Public Domain”, Bulletin of the Copyright Soci-
ety of the U.S.A. 14, 1967, p. 228.
26Ibid., p. 225.
27Stephen Breyer, “The Uneasy Case for Copyright”, Harvard Law Review 84, 1970, p. 326.
28Ibid., p. 327.
29Kaplan, “An Unhurried View of Copyright”, p. 115.
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of being utilitarian. As Krasilovsky wrote, the task of the government offices
he suggested was to encourage “orderly and efficient use for public benefit.”
The underlying objective is functionality and efficiency, which makes common
sense the base of the argument. The argument rests on what the most efficient
mechanism for achieving an optimal production of information goods is. Edwin
Hettinger later labelled this approach the “Utilitarian Justification,” and claimed
that it was similar to the justification for patents and copyrights in the American
constitution, viz. “to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.”30
2. The Economic Approach
Constructing an argument on the rather unspecific and fragile framework of utility
was not likely to be of much value in a country increasingly shaped by markets,
however, and it should not come as a surprise that Stephen Breyer in his 1970 ar-
ticle “The Uneasy Case for Copyright” concluded that “none of the noneconomic
goals served by copyright law seems an adequate justification for a copyright
system.”31 Rather, Breyer argued, intellectual property should be seen as a re-
muneration the society grants its “authors,” and the optimal length and strength
of the protection granted to the creator should be found through a simple com-
parison of the cost of exclusive ownership and the value of accessibility.
Kaplan’s argument that “scattered works may have commercial value after fifty-
six years hardly seems a justification for keeping all works under wraps for an-
other twenty years”32 illustrates this bias toward the economic reasoning be-
cause copyright is so strongly connected to commercial value. To Kaplan, it
seems, the protection should roughly correspond to the commercial life of the
work. This means that the inherent understanding of the public domain is that it
is a miscellaneous collection of commercially worthless works. It is not my ar-
gument that Kaplan did not in any way recognise any noneconomic value in the
public domain, but that his choice of words indicates that the context in which
they were written were rather unfavourable to noneconomic arguments. To make
his case, it seems, he had to rest it on an economic foundation.
The same applies to Breyer. His argument that “none of the noneconomic goals
served by copyright law seems an adequate justification”33 cannot be turned
30Edwin Hettinger, “Justifying Intellectual Property”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 18, 1989,
p. 47.
31Breyer, “The Uneasy Case for Copyright”, p. 291.
32Kaplan, “An Unhurried View of Copyright”, p. 115.
33Breyer, “The Uneasy Case for Copyright”, p. 291.
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around to say that “none of the noneconomic goals served by the public domain
seems an adequate justification.” So even though he did not explicitly deny that
there exists a noneconomic value of a strong public domain, he did not mention
it either. Whether Breyer did not think of mentioning any noneconomic goals
served by a strong public domain, or just did not bother to include that sort of
reasoning because it would not be effective as arguments in the context of the
revision bill debate in 1970, is irrelevant. The main point is that Breyer’s ar-
gument, especially seen in connection with Kaplan’s, shows how quintessential
the economic argument was to the copyright debate of the 1970s. To Breyer,
the argument “rest upon the economic inducement to publication that copyright
provides.”34
Another example of this economic reasoning is the discussion about copyright
protection after the author’s death. Perhaps the most obvious noneconomic ar-
gument is that the work should be seen as a sort of “family heirloom,” and, there-
fore, should be controlled by the family. Breyer, however, focuses more on the
economic incentive it creates. Will the author really consider how many years af-
ter his own death his work receives protection before he decides whether or not
to write the book? Breyer: “It is, of course, conceivable that some prospective
Miltons have given up writing after learning that Milton’s daugher was destitute,
but it is most unlikely.”35
3. The Rights-Based Approach
Even though it can be said that the economic reasoning dominated the debate,
some of the arguments were about privileges. I have called this the “rights-
based” approach, because it focuses on the entitlements human beings have
in our common culture. This approach is, at least to a certain degree, the in-
verse of the kind of argument on copyright Breyer described as being “based
upon the author’s ’moral rights’ to reap the fruit of his labors or to control what
he has created.”36 Instead of being the author’s rights, then, it is about the con-
sumers’ rights. The approach is perhaps best described by Kaplan, who wrote:
“I reflected that if a man has any ’natural’ rights, not the least must be a right to




37Kaplan, “An Unhurried View of Copyright”, p. 2.
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Kaplan was not the first to argue about a “right” to use, however. In the land-
mark 1918 Supreme Court case Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, Justice
Louis Brandeis hinted at a common right to that which is not protected: “[T]he
general rule of law is, that the noblest of human production — knowledge, truths
ascertained, conceptions, and ideas — become, after voluntary communication
to others, free as the air to common use.”38 Consistent with this line of argument,
Brandeis later held that “sharing the goodwill of an article unprotected by patent
or trademark is the exercise of a right possessed by all” in the 1938 case Kellogg
Co. v. National Biscuit Co.39
Still, this rights-based approach cannot be said to have been widespread, neither
before nor during the revision bill debate, and it was not nearly as important
as the commonsensical approach and the economic approach. The reason I
have included it as one of the three approaches I have focused on from the
revision bill debate is that such arguments were actually presented at the time,
the importance of which I am going to get back to below.
Recognising the Public Domain
By and large, the revision bill debate focused on copyright. The public domain
was seldom mentioned, and, with the notable exception of Krasilovsky’s 1967
article “Observations on Public Domain,” it was not the center of attention. Apart
from Krasilovsky, Lange’s 1981 article can therefore be said to have been the
first to focus primarily on the public domain. A quote from Litman illustrates
how unusual this approach was: “Although the public domain is implicit in all
commentary on intellectual property, it rarely takes central stage.”40
Recognising Krasilovsky’s importance, I will begin with a juxtaposition of Lange’s
and Krasilovsky’s understanding of the public domain before I turn to the com-
parison of Lange’s arguments and the typical arguments in the revision bill de-
bate. Lange’s article is recognised as the beginning of the modern debate on
the public domain, but his argument were, seemingly, not all that new.
38International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), p. 250.
39Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938), p. 122.
40Litman, “The Public Domain”, p. 977.
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Positive existence or negative existence
The main difference between Lange and Krasilovsky, at least when it comes to
their roles in initiating a public domain discourse, is their understanding of the
kind of entity the public domain is. Lange did not attempt to write a definition of
the public domain, but it is clear from the beginning of the article that the public
domain has a positive existence. Krasilovsky, on the other hand, did attempt
a definition. To Krasilovsky, the public domain is “the other side of the coin
of copyright [...] best defined in negative terms.”41 By writing this, Krasilovsky
made explicit an understanding of the public domain that had been inherent from
the beginning. And by “beginning,” I mean the creation of the immaterial public
domain as a legal entity in Anglo-American law by the enactment of the Statute
of Monopolies in 162342 and the Statute of Anne in 1710.43
One could argue, namely, that the original introduction of such a “public domain”
was done more or less unconsciously as the public domain is actually not men-
tioned in these statutes at all. As a result of this, one could say that the public
domain as a legal entity appeared as a negation of that which was protected.
This does not mean, however, that the public domain, or at least the limits of
copyright, were never discussed. But the approach was just as negatory as
Krasilovsky’s definition (in the sense of being absent, not its derogatory sense).
According to Joseph Yates in the 1762 lawsuit Tonson v. Collins, for instance,
“publication has [...] made the work common to every body; like land thrown into
the highway.”44 Moreover, Sir John Dalrymple followed Yates in the proceedings
in the critical 1774 House of Lords case Donaldson v. Beckett, and argued that
the publication of ideas makes them public: “[W]hen he publishes [ideas] they
are his no longer. If I take water from the ocean, it is mine, if I pour it back it
is mine no longer.”45 The copyright clause of the United States constitution fol-
lowed this negatory tradition wholeheartedly.46 The clause does not mention the
public domain specifically, but still confirms the existence of something which is
not protected — and, arguably, free to all — by stating that the exclusive right of
authors and inventors is only temporary.
41Krasilovsky, “Observations on the Public Domain”, p. 205.
42Tyler T. Ochoa, “Origins and Meanings of the Public Domain”, University of Dayton Law
Review 28, 2003, p. 215.
43Stanley W. Lindberg and L. Ray Patterson, The Nature of Copyright , (Athens (GA): University
of Georgia Press, 1991), p. 30.
44Joseph Yates in Mark Rose, Authors and Owners - The Invention of Copyright , (London:
Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 77.
45Sir John Dalrymple in Lindberg and Patterson, The Nature of Copyright , p. 39.
46Ibid., p. 47.
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At this point in time, “that which was not protected” was not even given a name.
The term “public domain” was primarily used to refer to land owned by the gov-
ernment throughout the 19th century, but was gradually introduced as a name
for these intellectual or cultural “commons” as well. According to Jessica Litman
and Tyler Ochoa, the term was exported to English from French through work on
the Berne Declaration in the 1880s and 1890s47. This claim is backed up by the
fact that the first time the United States Supreme Court used “public domain” as
a reference to an intellectual commons was in Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June
Manufacturing Co. in 1896.48 The term was used in its immaterial sense before
this, however, at least sporadically. One example is in a discussion of copyright
in European Countries in Harper’s Magazine in 1859: “[I]n Sweden [...] the work
falls into the public domain if the heirs neglect to reprint it.”49
The general understanding of the public domain, from Krasilovsky all the way
back to the Statute of Monopolies and the Statute of Anne, was what I have
called negatory. The public domain was, despite being given a name, “that which
is not protected,” which is why it was said that artistic and literary works “fall”
into the public domain. This public domain “tends to appear amorphous and
vague.”50 It has no boundaries, and is more like an endless and fleeting sea
than a solid, tangible piece of land.
Even in the 1966 case Graham v. John Deere Co., which according to James
Boyle was remarkable because it went “beyond a mere recitation of the Framers’
attitude toward the dangers posed by monopoly” and made “an affirmative ar-
gument for the public domain,”51 the public domain was not explicitly recognised
as a positive entity. Rather, the court simply held that “Congress may not au-
thorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge
from the public domain.”52 That William Krasilovsky in his 1967 article actually
attempted a definition was therefore novel, but the definition was just as nega-
tory as the recognition of the public domain in the Statute of Anne. The novelty
of Krasilovsky’s article was that he made the negatory view explicit.
Contrary to this, Lange regarded the public domain as something “positive.” To
Lange, the public domain was not a vast and limitless “unexplored abstraction.”
Rather, public domain is something, and extensions in copyright law has conse-
quences because it reduces the public domain. Despite the fact that Lange did
47Litman, “The Public Domain”, Ochoa, “Origins and Meanings of the Public Domain”, p. 215.
48Ibid.
49George William Curtis, “Editor’s easy chair”, Harper’s New Monthly Magazine, 1859, p. 275.
50Lange, “Recognizing the Public Domain”, p. 177.
51Boyle, “The Second Enclosure Movement”, p. 67.
52Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), 5f.
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not attempt to find a definition of “public domain,” Lange’s 1981 article stands
out (1) due to the way it puts the public domain center stage (even though Lange
shares this approach with Krasilovsky), and (2) due to the way it recognises the
public domain as a positive, existing entity. That being said, a number of the
arguments put forward in the article are similar to arguments put forward within
the context of the revision bill debate.
Lange and the approaches of the Revision Bill Debate
The first of Lange’s arguments that I am going to compare to the arguments
of the revision bill debate is his call for individual entitlements in that which is
not protected. After all, it is only a continuation of the arguments belonging to
the rights-based approach when Lange argues that “recognition of new intellec-
tual property interests should be offset today by equally deliberate recognition
of individual rights in the public domain.”53 This approach has been developed
significantly in a much later article by Lange, but in the 1981 article, “deliberate
recognition of individual rights in the public domain” is the full extent of his de-
scription of these rights. As such, this aspect of Lange’s article can only be seen
as a follow-up to the rights-based approach I described by quoting Kaplan and
Justice Brandeis above, and not a very innovative at that.
Moreover, the body of Lange’s article is a discussion of a number of different
copyright law cases. This discussion is meant as an illustration of how the growth
of intellectual property in the 1970s has been “uncontrolled to the point of reck-
lessness.”54 One of the cases is DC Comics, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, in
which a group of students at the Richard J. Daley campus of the City Colleges
of Chicago was sued by DC Comics, the owner of Superman, for naming their
school paper “The Daily Planet.” To remove any doubt as to the origin of the
name, Lange wrote, they also chose a planet to serve as the logo for the paper,
as well as the motto “Truth, Justice, and the American Way.” It was clearly not a
typo, but why, Lange asked, would anyone but the students care?
To Lange, the field of intellectual property was like “a game of conceptual Pac
Man in which everything in sight is being gobbled up.”55 This is eloquently put,
and a lot more polemical and sarcastic than Breyer and Kaplan. But Breyer and
Kaplan also criticised the copyright extensions. The difference between Lange
and his predecessors on this point is in degree, not in kind.
53Lange, “Recognizing the Public Domain”, p. 147.
54Ibid., p. 147.
55Ibid., p. 156.
28 Free as Air to Common Use — Part I
More unprecedented, however, is his view on what is lost without the public
domain: “As access to the public domain is choked, or even closed off altogether,
the public loses too,” Lange argues. More specifically, the public “loses the rich
heritage of its culture, the rich presence of new works derived from that culture,
and the rich promise of works to come.”56
There are two distinct notions of the value of the public domain in this quote. The
first is how the public domain encompass a “rich heritage.” Lange’s choice of
words is stronger, broader, and more passionate than Breyer’s, but the essence
is just the same as when Breyer argued that “old writing that someone wishes to
copy is likely to have unique merit or to be needed for research or education.”57
The second notion is more novel, however. When Lange wrote that the public
looses the “rich promise of works to come,” he indicated that the public domain
serves as some sort of “raw material” for new works. This notion is similar to
William Carman, who in his 1954 article “The Function of the Judge and the
Jury” argued that “they are the raw materials with which creative imaginations
must work, and under no circumstances can they in and of themselves become
the private property of any individual.”58 This is remarkably similar to Lange, and
contradicts the claim that Lange’s approach was novel. Carman’s article came
before the revision bill debate, however, which might indicate that the traditional
view of, well, the traditional view of the public domain might be wrong, and that
Lange was novel in the sense of bringing back something that had been lost.
There is also a case to be made for seeing this understanding of the public do-
main as raw material as a continuation of the view inherent in certain Supreme
Court cases in the early 1960s, but it is not strong. I have already mentioned
Graham v. John Deere Co., where the court held that “Congress may not au-
thorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge
from the public domain.”59 The argument is certainly reminiscent of Lange’s, but
the court is not explicit in its recognition of the public domain as raw material.
Rather, the court sees the value of the public domain as deriving from of its
important role in a competitive economy. It is impossible to copy, and, hence,
to compete, if the product is protected by intellectual property law. In this view,
copyright and patent must be balanced with the harm to society caused by loss
of competition. This argument is easily detectable in Justice Hugo Black’s dis-
senting opinion in the 1964 case Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement
56Lange, “Recognizing the Public Domain”, p. 164.
57Breyer, “The Uneasy Case for Copyright”, p. 326.
58William Carman, “The Function of the Judge and Jury in the ”Literary Property” Lawsuit”,
California Law Review 42, 1954, p. 58.
59Graham v. John Deere Co. 5f.
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Co.. In the opinion, Black held that articles that are not patentable are in the
public domain, and granting them any kind of “legally protected monopoly of-
fends the constitutional plan of a competitive economy.”60 To a certain degree
Lange’s “rich promise of works to come” is indeed comparable to the Supreme
Court cases of the early 1960s, but Lange’s approach is still sufficiently different
to be seen as a novelty.
Krasilovsky or Lange
As I have mentioned, Krasilovsky’s “Observations on Public Domain” is the most
serious contender for the position as the beginning the public domain discourse.
But the modern debate on the public domain did not begin in 1967. First,
Krasilovsky did not see the public domain as a positive entity. Rather, the
“Krasilovskian” public domain was “best defined in negative terms.” Second,
Krasilovsky did not contrast and juxtapose the protection of the public domain
and the expansion of intellectual property rights. Krasilovsky’s contention was
that we needed to improve the use of that which was in the public domain, but
he did not single out the underuse of public domain works as a result of too
strong intellectual property rights. His proposal was to create a government or-
ganization to enhance the common benefit of the public domain, not limit the
copyright term. As such, it could be argued that it would not be contradictory to
Krasilovsky’s position to solve this underuse by extending intellectual property
rights. Lange, on the other hand, argued explicitly against extensions of intellec-
tual property. The point in case is not that a disapproving view of copyright — or
at least the expansions of intellectual property rights in the late twentieth century
— is a prerequisite for being the “initiator” of the debate. Rather, the essential
quality is to make a connection between the public domain and intellectual prop-
erty. Krasilovsky does not have this connection, and so he does not fit into the
tradition of the debate. This brings me to the third point: Krasilovsky’s article is
not recognised as the beginning of the debate.
Recognition from within a debate itself it not a sufficient reason to accept that
a certain event was actually the event that separated two historical periods, but
when it fits with the actual situation it is often beneficial to include such a recog-
nition among the reasons for seeing the event as the breaking point. This is
the reason for mentioning the fact that Lange’s article is widely recognised as
the beginning of the modern debate. It would have been more obvious had
60Justice Hugo Black in Daphne R. Leeds, “Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong?”,
Columbia Law Review 64, 1964, p. 1188.
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the “Langean” public domain debate not been dormant throughout the whole of
the 1980s, but when the subject was brought up again Lange’s article was an
important inspiration.61
To sum up, it is my opinion that Lange did represent a break with the past (1)
because he hinted at a far more tangible recognition of the public domain, (2)
because he set the public domain center stage, (3) because he indicated the
value of the public domain as raw material for new works, and (4) because he did
all of this simultaneously. At the same time, however, a large part of his article
belongs to a tradition of copyright criticism deriving from the revision bill debate.
As such, it is fair to say that the modern debate on the public domain originated
in the realm of American copyright law scholars. What Lange did was to frame
a new public domain discourse by approaching the subject from a different point
of view.
To Lange, the public domain was a subject to be studied in its own right, not just
“the other side” of something more worthy of study. Nevertheless, the “public
domain” remained a subsidiary concept within intellectual property law for quite
some time. It stayed, one could perhaps say, within the context in which it was
born. This is why Debora Halbert wrote that “the idea of the public domain is
woven into the fabric of copyright and patent law.”62 It was not until the 1990s
and early 2000s that the public domain really emerged from the copyright realm
and became the “coordinating principle” of a new social theory on free culture
and immaterial rights.
World Wide Neoliberalism
As I showed in the last chapter, Lange’s 1981 article “Recognizing the Public
Domain” initiated the modern debate on the public domain by approaching “that
which is not protected” in a novel way. I also showed how the debate originated
in the realm of American copyright law scholars. My use of Supreme Court
cases regarding patent law in the 1960s can therefore be criticised for being be-
side the point, but they do demonstrate the fact that the public domain was not a
61Interview with Jessica Lange transcribed in Bollier, Viral Spiral , p. 59.
62Halbert, Resisting Intellectual Property , p. 16.
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concept exclusively belonging to copyright law and that the “public domain” was
certainly not “created” as such in 1981. Moreover, it brings attention to the fact
that recognition of the value of the public domain had been more apparent in the
case of patent law than in the case of copyright law. According to Litman, this
had been the case since the first U. S. patent statute. While the patent system
has always “incorporated a strong vision of the divide between patentable inven-
tions and technology in the public domain,” Litman writes, “the copyright system,
in contrast, has boasted no analogous overarching scheme.”63
The question that begs to be asked is why, but the answer seems to be rather
obvious. The public domain was brought forward because it helped to explain
why excessive expansion of copyright would be a bad thing. During the 1960s
and 1970s, it has been said, the copyright term was extended ten times.64 Con-
trary to this, however, it has also been argued that nine of these extensions can
be seen as preliminary extensions awaiting the final version of the revision bill.65
Still, Congress did extend the copyright term substantially in 1976, as well as
expand copyright in other ways, and there can be little doubt that people like
Kaplan, Breyer, and especially Lange actually saw this expansion as excessive.
On top of that, the shift toward liberalisation, privatisation and marketisation was
visible even in the 1970s. This trend inspired criticism. Lewis Hyde, for example,
wrote “The Gift” as a criticism of commercialisation of art in 1983, and Richard
Titmuss wrote his essay on “The Gift Relationship” and blood donation systems
as a criticism of the “crude utilitarianism” of capitalism as early as 1970. Looking
more closely, however, 1970 was not early at all. After all, Karl Polanyi wrote
his treatise on the marketisation of society — “The Great Transformation” — in
1944, not to mention people like Keynes and Marx. Criticism of capitalism has
actually been around for as long as capitalism has been around.
That criticism of capitalism has a long tradition does not mean that Lange did
nothing new in 1981, however. But it is important to keep in mind that the mod-
ern debate on the public domain is a part of this larger debate on capitalism
itself. What happened in the 1960s and 1970s was that a long standing ar-
rangement within the domain of knowledge and information was challenged by a
shift in copyright law. This explains why the modern debate on the public domain
originated in the realm of American copyright law scholars. The same line of rea-
soning can be applied to explain, inter alia, how the developments within patent
63Litman, “The Public Domain”, p. 978.
64Lessig, Free Culture, p. 134.
65Scott M. Martin, “The Mythology of the Public Domain”, Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
36, 2002, p. 260.
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law in the 1980s and 1990s led the participants of the debate to include the pub-
lic domain of inventions; as well as how the prominence of internet and open
source software in the debate was caused by radical technological changes.
But none of this explains the location. Why did the modern debate on the public
domain appear within the realm of American copyright law scholars, and not,
for instance, in the realm of political science, anthropology, or even economics?
According to David Bollier, the reason can be found in the fact that “law schools
became more like graduate schools and less like professional schools by the
1980s,” and, hence, that “copyright commentary began to get more scholarly
and independent of the industries it studied.”66 In my view, however, the question
is not that important. As I will show in this thesis, parallel analyses were put
forward in a number of other disciplines. The reason I have argued that the
modern debate originated in copyright law is (1) that copyright scholars were the
first to use the term “public domain” consistently, and (2) that this is the context
later participants recognise as the origin of the debate. This argument is similar
to the argument that Lange’s article was the beginning of the debate because it
is widely recognised as such.
Before I turn to the next phase of the modern debate on the public domain in
Part II, I am going to take a closer look at three aspects of the contemporary
situation of the 1980s and 1990s: (1) The impact of the neoliberal ideology, (2)
the development of internet as a low-cost, global communication infrastructure,
and (3) globalisation, or “World Wide Neoliberalism.”
1. Neoliberalism
The political situation of the 1980s and 1990s was strongly influenced by the
victory of Margaret Thatchers tories in the English Parliamentary election in
1979 and the election of Ronald Reagan in the American Presidential Elec-
tion in November 1980. The neoliberal ideology of the decade has thus been
called Thatcherism and Reagonomics, with a focus on the freedom of the mar-
ketplace, privatisation, a smaller and more efficient government, and tax reduc-
tion. This trend continued and even strengthened toward the 1990s, when it
was globalised, among other things, through the end of the cold war (which has
been seen as the triumph of capitalism over communism) and the structural ad-
justment programmes of the International Monetary Fund. This is what John
66Bollier, Viral Spiral , p. 55.
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Williamson labelled the “Washington Consensus” in 1989, which I earlier used
as an example of an exposition.
The main characteristic of this trend has been the shift toward the marketplace.
Examples include government functions, education, and the military. As I men-
tioned above, this trend was not new in 1980, but it can be argued that the drive
toward marketisation increased in strength. This marketisation and privatisation
changed the dynamic of society.
It often seems as if the fundamental tenet of this period was “private good, public
bad.” This understanding of the period is at least widespread within the modern
debate on the public domain. Lewis Hyde illustrates this tenet through an anec-
dote of an Englishman who is given a beautiful pipe as a peace offering upon his
visit to an Indian tribe. The Englishman does not realise that this pipe is a part
of a gift circle, and that he is expected to give it away again when someone visits
him. As a result, he “takes [the pipe] home and sets it on the mantelpiece.”67 By
doing this, he takes the pipe out of circulation, and destroys the gift exchange.
To the Englishman, the pipe only has value as property in his sense of the word.
Another example of marketisation is the biotechnology company Monsanto, that
sells genetically modified “terminator seeds.” Terminator seeds are seeds that
can only be sowed once. Selling terminator seeds is the opposite of traditional,
noncommercial seed exchange between local farmers. In addition, the “termi-
nator gene” — the terminational feature of these seeds — makes it impossible
to reuse the seed, and renders the traditional, noncommercial seed exchange
pointless.
2. The World Wide Web
The decades directly preceding the 1980s and 1990s were swamped with tech-
nological innovation, ranging from the Xerox photocopier, via the introduction
of TV into private homes to home video recording. The quote from Kaplan’s
1968 lecture “An Unhurried View of Copyright” I used above shows that it was
commonplace already then to talk about “the ’communications revolution’ of our
time.”68 But this revolution did not end with home video recording. Rather, the
period from 1960 to 2000 has seen continual innovation in communications tech-
nology.
67Lewis Hyde, The Gift , (Edinburgh: Canongate, 2006), p. 3.
68Kaplan, “An Unhurried View of Copyright”, p. 1.
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A short list of some of the most important technological changes during the
1980s and 1990s must at least include the “mutation” of the narrow and exclu-
sive precursor to the internet — ARPANET — into the internet, the combina-
tion of hyperlinked documents and this new internet into what Tim Berners-Lee
called the World Wide Web, and the cost reductions and ensuing spread of both
personal computers and cell phones during the 1990s and especially the early
2000s — as well as the dramatic rise in wireless networking it has sparked.
Strictly speaking, the internet is just the servers and the cables between them,
while the World Wide Web is the hyperlinked documents. The two terms are
often conflated in popular use, and when I write about internet I mean internet
in a rather broad sense as a combination of all of these technological changes.
The development of internet — in this “broad sense” — can be divided into three
main stages. The first stage was the pre-WWW stage of ARPANET and the
development of new, open communication protocols. The second stage was the
growth of the World Wide Web and its hyperlinked pages. These web pages
have been described as rather static, however. Not because they were static
in any way reminiscent of how printed media are static, but because they were
static compared to the dynamic pages of the third stage, which has been dubbed
“Web 2.0.” Web 2.0, or “participatory internet,” was characterised by dynamic
and collaborative web sites like Wikipedia, Slashdot, YouTube, Facebook, and
MySpace.
While the main character of the second stage is different in kind to the first
stage, the main character of the third stage is only different in degree to the
second stage. The internet of the 1990s was not really filled with “static” pages,
at least not in a strict sense of the word. On the contrary, even the second phase
was revolutionary in that it allowed a dramatically increased number of people
to publish information that could easily be changed or updated. When I write
“easily” I mean easily in the eyes of the contemporary observer, who would have
to compare it to publishing through a photocopier or a printing press. The fact
that updating web pages became even easier in the 2000s does not change
this argument. Also, the amount and length of textual information was virtually
limitless in both phases. With the introduction of participatory web sites like
Flickr and YouTube in the third stage one could perhaps argue that the amount
of pictures and videos, respectively, are also bordering on virtual limitlessness.
This is obviously a radical change from the second to the third stage. In my view,
however, an increase in storage capacity does not invalidate the argument that
the change between the second and third stage was a gradual one.
World Wide Neoliberalism 35
3. Globalisation
Joseph Stiglitz defines globalisation as “the removal of barriers to free trade
and the closer integration of national economies.”69 This definition is strictly
economic, and largely excludes both cultural aspects of globalisation and the
construction of a global — or at least a more global — identity due to increased
interaction across national borders. Also, globalisation, at least the way I am
going to use the term, encompasses an increase in the body of international
law. A number of international treaties have been negotiated and ratified during
the 1980s and 1990s, among others the Convention of the Law of the Sea, the
Kyoto Protocol and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. In the
context of intellectual property rights, both the 1991 revision of the Convention
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants and the American implementation
of the Berne Convention in 1988 are relevant examples, but the most important
is probably the 1995 TRIPS agreement of the World Trade Organisation. The
TRIPS Agreement was negotiated between 1986 and 1994, and came into ef-
fect January 1, 1995. Through this agreement, strong, western-style patent and
copyright law was expanded to almost all countries. John Perry Barlow criticised
this agreement in 1994 because it involved making “adherence to our moribund
systems of intellectual property protection a condition of membership in the mar-
ketplace of nations.”70 In this period, then, we have, at least to a certain degree,
seen a shift of jurisdiction from a national level to an international level.
In addition to marketisation and technological transformation, then, the general
trend of the 1980s and 1990s that influenced the modern debate on the public
domain the most was globalisation. The reason I have described globalisation as
a sort of “World Wide Neoliberalism,” however, is that in addition to being glob-
alisation, marketisation and technological change further fostered and strength-
ened it. In a word, they have both strengthened globalisation and been strength-
ened by globalisation. Easier and more affordable communication, as well as an
increase in the scope of communication technology, have made communication
across national borders easier and more straightforward. If it is true that we in-
creasingly see ourselves as members of a global community, the technological
innovations of the 1980s and 1990s have been an integral part of this.
69Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its discontents, (London: Penguin Books, 2002), p. ix.
70John Perry Barlow, “The Economy of Ideas”, WIRED, 1994. http://www.wired.com/wired/
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Part II
DECONSTRUCTION
Criticising the Notions of Intellectual Property
My argument has been that David Lange’s 1981 article “Recognizing the Public
Domain” should be seen as the beginning of the modern debate on the public
domain due to his explicit focus on the public domain as a positive entity; and,
moreover, that this “emergence” of the public domain discourse constitutes the
first phase of the debate. It is fairly obvious, however, that the debate was in
no way a fiery and fervent discussion that instantly burst out and flooded the
scientific journals or the newspapers columns. The next proper contribution to
the debate on the public domain was arguably not submitted until nine years
later. Not that the nine years passed by in complete silence, but few focused
solely on the public domain until Jessica Litman published “The Public Domain”
in 1990. Litman herself has said that when she discovered Lange’s article in the
late 1980s, “it had been neither cited nor excerpted nor reprinted nor anything—
because nobody was looking for a defense of the public domain.”71
In the decade of Reagonomics and Thatcherism that might appear to be cor-
rect, but it is not entirely true. The neoliberal ideology was influential, but not
completely dominant. Both Grossman and Stiglitz’ 1980 article “On the Impos-
sibility of Informationally Efficient Markets,” Lewis Hyde’s 1983 “The Gift,” and
Edwin Hettinger’s 1989 “Justifying Intellectual Property,” to mention but a few,
can be seen as criticism of the marketisation of the realm of knowledge and in-
formation. Having said that, Litman’s assertion seems to be more accurate if it
is limited to law, and especially copyright law. Moreover, neither Grossman and
Stiglitz, Hyde nor Hettinger argues explicitly about a “public domain.” And when
Carol Rose wrote “The Comedy of the Commons” as a reply to Garrett Hardin’s
“Tragedy of the Commons” in 1986, she wrote about land, not knowledge and
information. Litman’s assertion is therefore correct in the sense that nobody
looked for a defense of the Langean public domain I described in Part I.
71Interview with Jessica Litman transcribed in Bollier, Viral Spiral , p. 59.
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As a result of this, I view Litman’s 1990 article “The Public Domain” as the first
main paper within copyright law to approach the public domain in the same di-
rect manner as Lange did. On the whole, however, it was Hettinger’s 1989 arti-
cle “Justifying Intellectual Property” that was the first main paper of the second
phase, which means that the debate was no longer confined to copyright law.
Besides incorporating inventions protected by patents and information protected
by trade secrets into the argument, he was a professor of philosophy. Hettinger
only used the term “public domain” once, however, and did not associate him-
self with Lange. In my view, this does not diminish the relevance of the article.
Hettinger clearly writes about the same subject matter as the other participants
in the modern debate on the public domain, despite the fact that he does not
really use the term “public domain.” Besides, none of the participants in the
debate acknowledged that they were actually participants in the debate at the
time. Thus, a lack of references to the debate — which at the time only meant
Lange — does not void Hettinger’s contribution. Moreover, his inspiration came,
as he wrote, both from the “vastly improved information-handling technologies”
and from the “larger role information is playing in our society.”72 This inspiration
is similar to the inspiration of other participants in the debate. In addition to this,
the arguments he presented have become some of the core arguments within
the later social theory on free culture.
The most important characteristic of this second phase of the debate, however,
is deconstruction. At this point in time, there existed no clear definition of the
public domain, and the obligatory component of any treatment of the subject
was a critical analysis of intellectual property. In the following, I am therefore
going to describe two of these deconstructive attempts in detail. The first is
Hettinger’s criticism of the “labour justification of property,” the second Jessica
Litman’s analysis of the “romantic notion of authorship.” In the last chapter of
Part II, I turn to James Boyle’s theory on instruments that facilitates deconstruc-
tion, and a discussion of the applicability of these instruments. Writing in 1992,
Boyle was as much a part of the second phase of the debate as Hettinger and
Litman were, but in addition to his analysis of information issues, he considered
the theoretical aspects of deconstruction itself. I will therefore consider Boyle’s
theoretical analysis in light of some of the deconstructive attempts of this phase.
72Hettinger, “Justifying Intellectual Property”, p. 32.
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The Labour Justification of Property
“Perhaps the most powerful intuition supporting intellectual property rights,” Het-
tinger wrote in 1989, is that “people are entitled to the fruits of their labor.”73 This
is often called the author’s “natural right” or “moral right.” In light of the fact that
Hettinger focuses almost exclusively on these natural rights, however, it is inter-
esting to note they were so easily dismissed by Breyer in 1970. As I showed
in Part I, Breyer’s argument was that “none of the noneconomic goals served
by copyright law seems an adequate justification for a copyright system.”74 This
can, of course, be ascribed to some peculiarity in Breyer. That he had a pre-
disposition toward economic reasoning, for example. After all, the natural right
approach was not new in the 1980s.75
Another possible interpretation is that Breyer’s dismissal was representative of
the revision bill debate, and that the natural rights reasoning had an upswing in
the late 1970s and 1980s. This might seem strange, given that marketisation
and commodification dominated the American public debate. Neoliberalism was
not only about marketisation, however, it was just as much about “individualisa-
tion.” One should be one’s own man. It is not likely that Margaret Thatcher ever
actually said that “a man who, beyond the age of 26, finds himself on a bus can
count himself as a failure.” It is an apocryphal quote, but it illustrates the ethos
of the age brilliantly. Consequently, a natural right to one’s intellectual creation
is not as antithetical to neoliberalism as it would have been if marketisation was
the only matter. What seems to be clear, at least, is that Hettinger saw the natu-
ral rights reasoning as sufficiently widespread by the late 1980s to focus almost
exclusively on the subject.
Hettinger began his argument with an exposition of Locke’s labour theory of
property. According to Peter Drahos, Locke on property “has a totemic status.”76
Despite the fact that Locke did not write directly about intellectual property, then,
it is not surprising that Locke’s theory is often the starting point of a discussion
on the justification of intellectual property. There are, however, differing opinions
73Hettinger, “Justifying Intellectual Property”, p. 36.
74Breyer, “The Uneasy Case for Copyright”, p. 291.
75See, e.g., William Strauss, “The Moral Right of the Author”, The American Journal of Com-
parative Law , 1955.
76Peter Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property , (Sydney: Dartmouth, 1996), p. 41.
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on how to intepret his theory even on subjects Locke actually wrote about. Thus,
it is certainly not a surprise that the lack of definite lockean language on patents
and copyright has caused the opinions on how to extend his theory to the field
of intellectual property to be even more disparate.
In short, Locke’s theory is based on two premises: First, the earth and all inferior
creatures are “common to all men.” Second, every man has a property in his
own person — “the labour of his body, and the work of his hands [...] are prop-
erly his.” From this, Locke builds his famous argument: “Whatsoever then he
removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed
his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it
his property.”77 Locke then adds two conditions for appropriating what one has
“mixed one’s labour with.” First, any appropriation must leave “enough, and as
good” for others. Second, what one appropriates should not go to waste. Locke:
“Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy.”78
Seana Shiffrin argues that intellectual property, at least at first, seems “particu-
larly well suited to the application of Locke’s theory.”79 First, there seems to be
no raw material involved at all. While printing a book involves cutting down a tree
in order to make paper, writing a book does not involve the removal of anything
from others. Due to the nonrival nature of knowledge and information, the words
used are still available for others to use in other books. Labour is therefore the
only factor in the production process, which makes it even easier to justify ap-
propriation. This also means that there will always be “enough, and as good” left
for others. Moreover, knowledge and information does not rot, and will therefore
never go to waste.
This analysis starts with an understanding of the initial public domain as empty.
In this view, “intellectual products are completely the inventions of their authors,”
and the “creation of intellectual products does not involve any use of common
resources.”80 Here, attribution is completely at the side of the author. The author
is a creator. Contrary to this, however, the author can also be seen as a mere
discoverer that finds and brings products out of the public domain, but does not
create, develope or refine them. Here, attribution is completely at the side of the
public domain. The author is a discoverer. In the middle of these rather extreme
77John Locke, Two Treatises of Government , (Cambridge (MA): Hackett Publishing Company,
1698), p. 288.
78Ibid., p. 290.
79Seana Shiffrin, “Lockean Arguments for Private Intellectual Property”. In: New Essays in
the Legal and Political Theory of Property , ed. by Stephen R. Munzer, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001, p. 139.
80Ibid., p. 159.
40 Free as Air to Common Use — Part II
views, “only the subject matter and materials of intellectual products [...] facts,
concepts, ideas, propositions, literary themes, musical themes, and values [are]
in the commons.”81 Here, attribution is somewhere between the author and the
public domain. The author is a developer.
It is only based on an understanding of the author as such a creator that my
suggested application of Locke’s theory on intellectual property is reasonable.
If the author is seen as a developer or a discoverer the use of Locke’s theory
requires a more thorough argument. To Hettinger, the author is neither seen
as a developer nor as a discoverer, however. In fact, Hettinger’s view does not
seem to fit into Shiffrin’s threeway categorisation at all. To Hettinger, the author
is more of a participant :
Invention, writing, and thought in general do not operate in a vacuum; in-
tellectual activity is not creation ex nihilo. Given this vital dependence of a
person’s thoughts on the ideas of those who came before her, intellectual
products are fundamentally social products.82
Strictly speaking, the view of the author as a discoverer and as a participant are
similar, but viewing the author as a participant seems to put greater emphasis on
the collaborative aspect. To Hettinger, facts, concepts, ideas, propositions, liter-
ary themes, musical themes, etc. does not constitute a divinely bestowed trea-
sury or a reservoir authors travel to in order to collect the raw material needed for
their books. Rather, facts, concepts, ideas, etc. are created continually. In this
view, “all modern things, like cars and such,” have not always existed, “waiting in
a mountain,” like the Icelandic singer Bjørk considers in her song “The Modern
Things.” But even if all the “raw material” is the result of human labour, Hettinger
argues, the value “is not entirely attributable to any particular laborer.”83
Hettinger began his argument by paraphrasing Robert Nozick’s critique of Locke’s
premises. In his 1974 book “Anarchy, State, and Utopia,” Nozick asked why
mixing something one owns with something one does not own should result in
gaining the thing one did not own rather than loosing the thing one did own.
More specifically, “if I own a can of tomato juice and spill it in the sea [...], do I
thereby come to own the sea, or have I foolishly dissipated my tomato juice?”84
To Hettinger, this raises the question of what the entitlement of labour should be.
Given that the author is seen as a discoverer, developer, or participant, and not
a creator, value consists of two components: First, the value “attributable to the
81Shiffrin, “Lockean Arguments for Private Intellectual Property”, p. 159.
82Hettinger, “Justifying Intellectual Property”, p. 38.
83Ibid., p. 38.
84Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), p. 175.
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object labored on;” and, second, the value “attributable to the labor.”85 Labour
justifies a property right in the value of the labour, argued Hettinger, not “the to-
tal value of the resulting product.”86 The mistake, Hettinger wrote, “is to conflate
the created object which makes a person deserving of a reward with what the
reward should be.”87 Hettinger eloquently compared this to the lifting of a car:
A person who relies on human intellectual history and makes a small mod-
ification to produce something of great value should no more receive what
the market will bear than should the last person needed to lift a car receive
full credit for lifting it.88
Based on this analysis, Hettinger claimed that the notion of the author’s “natural
right” is a myth. Information and knowledge are “socially created.” Because
of this, Hettinger argued, in what way individual labourers are compensated for
their work is “a question of social policy.”89 This does not mean, however, that
Hettinger does not recognise any natural rights at all. But the author’s and the
inventor’s natural right is the right to use what they have created. Hettinger:
The natural right of an author to personally use her writings is distinct from
the right, protected by copyright, to make her work public, sell it in a market,
and then prevent others from making copies. An inventor’s natural right to
use the invention for her own benefit is not the same as the right, protected
by patent, to sell this invention in a market and exclude others (including
independent inventor) from using it.90
Turning my original suggestion for a lockean justification of intellectual property
more or less on its head, Hettinger thus argued that the only property right
Locke’s theory would legitimise was the right to personal use of what one has
created. In Hettinger’s view, the only justification for intellectual property is a
“utilitarian argument based on providing incentives.”91
As mentioned, Hettinger only used the term “public domain” once. Still, phrases
like “human intellectual history,” “this socially created phenomenon,” and “the
historical/social component” does refer to some sort of “public domain.” Even
though Hettinger did not write explicitly about the public domain, his article can
be interpreted as a public domain-based criticism of intellectual property. To
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Hettinger, copyright and patent law cannot be justified through a reinterpreta-
tion of Locke. Rather, intellectual property can only be justified as a socially
constructed property right based on utility. Even though Hettinger did not write
explicitly about the public domain, however, there can be little doubt that his call
for a reconstruction of intellectual property builds on a recognition of the value
of “the historical/social component” of intellectual creation — the public domain
— and how this component is “socially created.”
The Romantic Notion of Authorship
In her 1990 article “The Public Domain,” Jessica Litman came to a similar con-
clusion as Hettinger, despite the fact that their approach and their frames of
reference were different. While Hettinger focused equally on patents, copyright
and trade secrets, Litman focused almost exclusively on copyright. Moreover,
Litman argued within the context of copyright law, while Hettinger argued within
a philosophical and political sphere. What they had in common was their view
on “that which is not protected.”
In addition to this, however, they shared a negatory approach toward the subject
matter. Rather than to argue positively about what the public domain is, they
argued negatively. Their argument is, in fact, a deconstruction of some of the
notions they saw as a threat to the public domain. In this view, Hettinger’s ar-
gument was that the labour justification of property was not as convincing as it
seemed, because it was oblivious to the participatory nature of intellectual cre-
ation. Likewise, Litman’s argument was that what she calls “the romantic notion
of authorship” had distorted our understanding of the appropriateness and ne-
cessity of intellectual property. It is this analysis I turn to now.
According to Foucault, not all authors are alike. Rather, some authors create
more than just “their own works.” Foucault’s examples are Ann Radcliffe, who
authored both books and the Gothic horror genre, and Freud and Marx, who
created new discourses as well as The Interpretation of Dreams and Das Kap-
ital. As a result of this, later authors necessarily build upon the work of earlier
authors. For example, all authors writing within the Gothic horror genre make
use of something from Ann Radcliffe, while all authors writing psychoanalytical
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books build on something from Freud. Authors within the marxian discourse are
even using Marx’ name. To Foucault, authors like Radcliffe, Freud, and Marx
“have produced something else: the possibilities and the rules for the formation
of other texts.”92 They are what Foucault labelled the “founders of discursivity.”
To use the modern debate on the public domain as an example of this, we could
perhaps say that Lange was a “founder of discursivity” just as much as Radcliffe,
Freud, and Marx. At least to a certain degree, Lange can be recognised as the
“founder” of the debate. As I have shown, however, Lange’s contribution in his
1981 article “Recognizing the Public Domain” was rather small. A large part of
his argument was derived from other people.
The reason this article is recognised as the beginning, then, is because its con-
tribution finally elevated the subject to a proper debate. As a result of this, it
is fairly obvious that crediting Lange’s article is a simplification. This simplifica-
tion is necessary, however, as a tool to limit the “cancerous and dangerous [...]
proliferation of significations.” To Foucault, the author “is the principle of thrift
in the proliferation of meaning.”93 Faced with a frightening number of possible
interpretations, we turn to the author’s intention as a way to fix meaning.94
Even though my example has been the “author” of a debate, this notion of au-
thorship — as the principle of thrift in the proliferation of meaning — is also used
in general. In addition to being an acknowledgement of authorship through nam-
ing, Foucault would say that the author-notion is an instrument used to organise
meaning. In the context of the modern debate on the public domain, this analysis
is at the base of Litman’s “romantic model of authorship.” Appropriately enough,
given the subject, Litman did not create this analysis from scratch. Rather, she
built upon earlier work, especially a 1984 article by Martha Woodmansee, and
an early 1988 article by Boyle.
In her 1984 article “The Genius and the Copyright” Woodmansee argued that
“author” in its modern sense is a relatively recent invention. It was given its
new meaning by a group of German writers who wanted to make a living writing
for a new and rapidly expanding reading public in the eighteenth century. Wood-
mansee examined the relationship between this concept of authorship and copy-
right, but did not argue explicitly either for or against it. Rather, she explained
how copyright could not have been what it is if it was not for the notion of the
92Michel Foucault, “What Is An Author?” In: The Foucault Reader , ed. by Paul Rabinow, Lon-
don: Penguin Books, 1991, pp. 101–120, p. 114.
93Ibid., p. 118.
94James Boyle, “The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers”, American Univer-
sity Law Review 37, 1988. http://www.law.duke.edu/boylesite/Shakesp.htm (May 11, 2009).
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author as “an individual who is solely responsible—and therefore exclusively de-
serving of credit—for the production of a unique work.”95
In his 1988 article on Shakespeare, Boyle picked up Woodmansee’s thread,
and argued that the specific understanding of authorship she described was a
“romantic notion of authorship.” To Boyle, it is this conception that has caused
the controversies over who Shakespeare really was. We project this conception
back through history, Boyle wrote, as if it was universal. Then we find fault with
the Bard of Avon as he has been presented to us through the centuries, and ask
ourselves whether the plays were perhaps written by someone else, someone
that fits with our understanding of him as the greatest author of all better than
the man born in Stratford.96
This critique of a “romantic notion of authorship,” which Litman calls a “romantic
model,” lies at the heart of Litman’s article. To Litman, this inspiration is exactly
what authorship is about. In Litman’s view, authors do not create something from
nothing. Rather, the essence of authorship is “translation and recombination”97
In the beginning of her article, Litman fittingly quotes Spider Robinson’s award
winning short story “Melancholy Elephants”: “Artists have been deluding them-
selves, for centuries, with the notion that they create. In fact they do nothing of
the sort.”98
But, even though we can see some of Foucault’s, Woodmansee’s, and Boyle’s
arguments in Litman’s article, the arguments have been rearranged, reshaped
and rephrased to fit the debate on the public domain. Litman:
Composers recombine sounds they have heard before; playwrights base
their characters on bits and pieces drawn from real human beings and other
playwrights’ characters; novelists draw their plots from lives and other plots
within their experience; software writers use the logic they find in other soft-
ware; lawyers transform old arguments to fit new facts; cinematographers,
actors, choreographers, architects, and sculptors all engage in the process
of adapting, transforming, and recombining what is already ”out there” in
some other form. This is not parasitism: it is the essence of authorship.99
Litman’s argument can thus be summarised as follows: Authors do not only
reuse that which has already been created by others. Rather, this form of reuse
95Woodmansee, “The Genius and the Copyright”, p. 426.
96Boyle, “The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers”.
97Litman, “The Public Domain”, p. 966.
98Spider Robinson, “Melancholy Elephants”, 1983. http : / / www . spiderrobinson . com /
melancholyelephants.html (May 11, 2009).
99Litman, “The Public Domain”, 966f.
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is more or less tantamount to authorship itself. Thus, in the absence of a vigor-
ous public domain, a large part of authoring as we know it would be illegal.100
The necessary conclusion to this is that the public domain is indispensable as
“raw material available for other authors to use.”101
Having finished my discussion on Hettinger’s “labour justification of property”
and Litman’s “romantic notion of authorship,” I now turn to Boyle’s theoretical
analysis of deconstruction notions like these. It is clearly beyond the scope of
this thesis to place Boyle’s theoretical approach in a historical context, and I will
content myself with a description of his theory in itself as it illustrates at what
stage the introspective analyses of the modern debate on the public domain
were at in the second phase of the debate.
The Treachery of Images
In 1992, James Boyle wrote that “[i]t is hard, nowadays, to find a piece of fu-
turology that doesn’t say we are entering an information age.”102 Still, little re-
search had been done on the information society at that time. According to
Boyle, the tools needed to “uncover that which is suppressed or rendered invis-
ible by the overwhelming familiarity of our social arrangements”103 did not exist
in the context of information, at least not in any significant way like they did, e.g.,
in the context of the modern state, democratic traditions, or the division between
capital and labour. Accordingly, tools, in this context, is intellectual instruments
increasing our understanding of a subject.
To make his case, Boyle drew upon Felix Cohen and argued that definitions
are not useful or useless in themselves. Rather, a definition is “useful if it in-
sures against risks of confusion more serious than any that the definition itself
contains.”104 As such, definitions are similar to abstractions and generalisations
because they, too, are language-based tools we employ to make sense of the
100Ibid., p. 967.
101Ibid., p. 1023.
102James Boyle, “A Theory of Law and Information, Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider
Trading”, California Law Review 80, 1992, p. 1416.
103Ibid., p. 1423.
104Felix S. Cohen in ibid., p. 1424.
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world. It is all a process of “naming.” As part of an analysis of a folk tale about
a shoemaker and two elves, which I am going to describe in more detail in Part
III, Lewis Hyde wrote: “To put clothes on a thing is a kind of acknowledgment,
like giving it a name. By this act we begin to differentiate what was undifferen-
tiated.”105 Calling an author an author is the first act of naming. This naming
is certainly an acknowledgement of the author. But something similar happens
when the label “author” is used to indicate a romantic notion, as in the case of
Litman’s “romantic model of authorship.” This attempt to criticise and deconstruct
is also an acknowledgement, “like giving it a name.”
Based on this understanding of definitions Boyle maintains (1) that “every dispute
about property rights in information resolves itself into a dispute about whether
the issue ’is’ in the public or the private realm.”106 If this was true, argues Boyle,
it would be like looking at a map. Every dispute would be “a factual inquiry about
the location of a preexisting entity within a well-charted and settled terrain.”107
To Boyle, however, the landscape the map is supposed to represent is a socially
constructed and continually adapting scene which “folds back onto itself like a
Mo¨bius strip.”108 Moreover, Boyle argues (2) that contemporary economic analy-
ses suppress the contradictions caused by the duality of information by “relying
unconsciously on the notion of the romantic author.”109
To Boyle, both the notion of the romantic author and the existence of such a
map, which Boyle argues would have to be drawn by Dali, Magritte, or Escher,
are illusions. As such, they are useless, and perhaps even dangerous. There are
no “intelligible geography of public and private,” writes Boyle, and trying to solve
these problems by drawing lines is “an empty exchange of stereotypes.” Here,
Boyle quotes Nietzsche, and writes that these empty exchanges of stereotypes
are “illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors
which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their
pictures and now matter only as metal, no longer as coins.”110
It is not my argument that Boyle was the first within the modern debate on the
public domain to notice this “Treachery of Images.”111 Rather, Boyle was the
first to include an introspective methodology in an article on the public domain.
105Hyde, The Gift , p. 51.




110Friedrich Nietzsche in ibid., p. 1436.
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In some ways, Lange, Hettinger, Litman, and Boyle illustrates the development
of a self-consciousness with regard to the methodology one uses in research.
First, Lange simply wrote about the public domain. Then Hettinger and Litman
started to analyse and deconstruct notions related to the subject, before Boyle
discussed the methodology of deconstruction itself. Hence, to the degree that
self-consciousness is a part of the development of a field of study, Boyle’s dis-
cussion of the instruments that facilitates deconstruction signifies that the study
of the public domain had reached a new level.
This means that even though creating these “tools” might seem to belong to the
reconstructive phase of the debate, it does actually belong to the deconstruc-
tive phase of the debate — an instrument that facilitates deconstruction is just
as much a “tool” as an instrument that is “constructive.” What I mean by this is
that even though creating a tool is, by definition, a “constructive” act, a tool that
makes it easier to expose wrongful or incoherent systems of thought is never-
theless an instrument that facilitates deconstruction. Boyle, for instance, focuses
exclusively on tools that facilitates deconstruction.
Neither Boyle nor any of the other participants in the modern debate on the pub-
lic domain specifies how they use the terms “conception,” “notion,” and “illusion,”
even though the tools with which they attempt to deconstruct the wrongful and
misleading conceptions related to information issues and the public domain are,
in fact, conceptions, notions and illusions. This is not necessarily a bad thing, as
it is usually quite easy to see whether they view something as useful or useless.
In the following, however, I am for the most part going to use “notion” about con-
ceptions which are seen as useful, “illusion” about conceptions which are seen
as useless or even corrupting, and “conceptions” about culturally, politically, eco-
nomically, and socially created categories and ideas. In a way, conceptions are
the bricks of discourses.
In the rest of this chapter, I am going to discuss Boyle’s theory on the “Treachery
of Images” in light of specific notions and illusions of intellectual property that
were deconstructed in the second phase of the modern debate on the public
domain — especially authorship and natural rights.
According to Boyle, it is the “overwhelming familiarity of our social arrangements”
that causes the uncovering of these illusions to be so hard112 In accordance
with this, Peter Jaszi claimed that copyright scholars focuses more on technical
issues of right and wrong as presented by judicial opinions than on analysing and
112Boyle, “A Theory of Law and Information”, p. 1423.
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deconstructing copyright narratives in his 1991 article on “The Metamorphoses
of ’Authorship”’:
Legal scholars’ failure to theorize copyright relates to their tendency to mythol-
ogize “authorship,” leading them to fail (or refuse) to recognize the founda-
tional concept for what it is—a culturally, politically, economically, and so-
cially constructed category rather than a real or natural one.113
In her 1991 article “Copyright as Myth,” Litman mostly used the same reason-
ing to explain the widespread public support of copyright. But contrary to Jaszi,
Litman did not only point to the romantic notion of authorship. Rather, Litman
attributed much of the support to a combination of (1) the romantic notion of au-
thorship and (2) the pervasiveness of what she labelled the “Copyright Myth.”
The copyright myth, according to Litman, is a rather romantic view of how copy-
right law works to protect authors and creators. According to this myth, copyright
is something the creator gets when he sends his creation to the Copyright Office
in Washington, but only if the work is deemed to be good enough. That copy-
right law might be as rigorous so as to stifle the act of creation itself is unheard
of within the context of the copyright myth.114
The copyright myth, the romantic notion of authorship, and the natural rights
argument Hettinger criticised are the three most important “deconstructive tools”
— in the “boylean” sense of the word— of the second phase of the debate. What
these three have in common is that they are notions which support intellectual
property. As such, they belong to a discourse on intellectual property. At the
same time, however, they influence how the public domain is understood, which
makes them, and especially their deconstruction, belong to the public domain
discourse. In addition to this kind of notions, however, there are two other kinds
I wish to mention.
The first is what Litman has described as a naive understanding of laws in gen-
eral. In her 1994 article “The Exclusive Right to Read,” Litman argued that one
part of the problem is “that many people persist in believing that laws make
sense.”115 Any claim as to the irrationality or the malfunction of a law is met with
the counterargument that the law does not say so, was not intended to be like
that, or, perhaps, is “one of those laws, like the sodomy law, that it is okay to
ignore.”116 This “naive view of laws’ soundness” is a lot more general than con-
113Jaszi, “Toward a Theory of Copyright - The Metamorphoses of ”Authorship””, p. 459.
114Jessica Litman, “Copyright as Myth”, University of Pittsburgh Law Review 53, 1991, p. 237.
115Jessica Litman, “The Exclusive Right to Read”, Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal
13, 1994, p. 50.
116Ibid., p. 50.
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cepts within the sphere of ownership of intellectual creation, but it still influences
the way people understand issues related to the public domain.
The second is the trope of the “Tragedy of the Commons,” which is a theory on
the “tragic” properties of the public domain that originated in a discussion on
tangible public domain and commons in the 1960s. To be more specific, the
expression stems from Garrett Hardin’s 1968 article “Tragedy of the Commons,”
where he portrayed the dangers of overpopulation by using the commonly owned
grasslands of old England as a metaphor. If a pasture is open to all, argued
Hardin, the rational choice of each herdsman will be to keep as many animals at
the pasture as possible. The reason for this is that the positive utility of an addi-
tional animal is given to the herdsman, while the negative effects of overgrazing
are shared by all the herdsmen. This will eventually lead to overgrazing, argues
Hardin, which — tragically — destroys the pasture for all.117
Despite the fact that the article actually discussed overpopulation, Hardin’s “Tragedy
of the Commons” has been put to use as an analysis of the “tragedy” of pub-
lic ownership. As such, it has become an argument in favour of privatisation.
Through a description of a number of examples of well-functioning publicly man-
aged commons throughout history, Carol Rose attempts to deconstruct the no-
tion of such a tragedy in her 1986 article “The Comedy of the Commons.”118
Hence, this is an example of a notion about the malfunction of ownership organ-
ised through public domain and commons.
The argument of the “deconstructionists” of the modern debate on the public
domain, e.g. Hettinger, Litman, and Boyle in his 1992 article “A Theory of Law
and Information,” is that notions preclude an accurate understanding of the pub-
lic domain both among scholars and in the general public. To Litman, for in-
stance, the romantic notion of authorship and the widespread copyright myth
have played important roles in creating a strong popular support for copyright.
Taken together, it is fairly safe to say that the copyright myth, the romantic notion
of authorship, the idea of an author’s natural right to his work, the naive view of
laws, and the tragedy of the commons have influenced both popular and schol-
arly understanding of the public domain and restrained prospective resistance
against strengthening intellectual property rights.
That said, the value and usefullness of deconstruction of illusions always stands
the chance of being reverted by the creation of new illusions. In 2002, Scott
Martin argued that this was what had happened within the modern debate on
117Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons”, Science 162, 1968.
118Carol Rose, “The Comedy of the Commons”, University of Chicago Law Review 53, 1986.
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the public domain.119 According to Martin, the philosophy behind some of the
contributions within the debate began with the myth “copyright good, public do-
main better.”120 Contrary to the deconstructive aims of scholars like Litman and
Boyle, and instead of tearing down wrongful assumptions, Martin argued, the
contributions to the debate had erected a number of myths about the nature and
role of the public domain.
Martin’s use of the term “myth” is different from Boyle’s use of the term notion,
however. To Martin, a myth is simply defined as “an unfounded or false notion
[...] having only an imaginary or unverifiable existence.”121 Martin’s myths are
therefore not what I called “tools we employ to make sense of the world” above,
and are probably best defined as “false assumptions.” And the false assump-
tions Martin focuses on are not related to notions like the romantic author. More
precisely, Martin focuses predominantly on the legal authority of Congress re-
lated to the enactment of the Copyright Term Extension Act in 1998. As such,
Martin’s article does not seem to be much about the “Mythology of the Public
Domain” at all.
A more pertinent criticism of the typical argument within the modern debate on
the public domain came from Edward Samuels, who in his 1993 article “The
Public Domain in Copyright” asked: “What is gained by reifying the negative,
and imagining a ’theory’ of the public domain?”122 Based on Boyle’s and Co-
hen’s theory on the usefulness of definitions I mentioned above, constructing a
notion of the public domain should be useful if it “insures against risks of confu-
sion more serious than any that the definition itself contains.” The usefulness of
deconstructing illusions on authorship, natural rights, and so on, should there-
fore be measured against the risks of confusion caused by the construction of a
notion of the public domain.
A similar criticism of the notion of the public domain was put forward by Anupam
Chander and Madhavi Sunder in their 2004 article “The Romance of the Public
Domain.” I am going to discuss this criticism in greater detail in Part IV, but I
have chosen to briefly mention it here because of its “deconstructive” aspects.
“Trapped in a discourse framed by Hardin’s law and economics prophecy,” Chan-
119I have chosen to include Martin’s 2002 article “The Mythology of the Public Domain,” as
well as Anupam Chander’s and Madhavi Sunder’s 2004 article “The Romance of the Public
Domain,” in this discussion on the deconstructive phase of the modern debate on the public
domain despite the fact that they were written as late as the 2000s. The reason for this is that
they are about notions and illusions regarding the public domain.
120Martin, “The Mythology of the Public Domain”, p. 255.
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der and Sunder wrote, “the literature regarding the commons remains impover-
ished, captured by a nearly single-minded concern for efficiency.”123 Moreover,
they argued that the proponents of the public domain had been lured by a “siren
call,” and that the discourse on the public domain was increasingly dominated by
a binary tenor “in which we must choose either intellectual property or the pub-
lic domain.”124 To Chander and Sunder, this “obscures other important interests,
options, critiques, and claims for justice that are embedded in many new claims
for property rights,” and the public domain was becoming a “source for exploiting
the labor and bodies of the disempowered—namely, people of color, the poor,
women, and people from the global South.”125
To sum up, it seems quite clear that this phase of the modern debate on the
public domain represents a significant theoretical and conceptual development
of the subject matter. In the early 1980s the public domain discourse was limited
to an approach. Through deconstruction of notions related to intellectual prop-
erty the modern debate on the public domain had by the early 1990s obtained
at least a makeshift vocabulary and the rough outline of a theoretical framework
— as well as self-consciousness regarding the methodology of the analyses.
123Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder, “The Romance of the Public Domain”, California





Replacing the Scaffolding and Falsework
It has been my argument that the public domain emerged from the copyright
realm and became the ’coordinating principle’ of a new social theory on free cul-
ture and immaterial rights, and that this process can be broadly categorised into
four phases. I have already discussed the first phase, when the public domain
discourse emerged with David Lange’s 1981 article “Recognizing the Public Do-
main,” as well as the second phase, when the participants of the debate made
an attempt to “break away” from the confines of intellectual property by decon-
structing notions that supposedly precluded an accurate understanding of the
public domain. By analogy, the maturation of this second phase would be a kind
of adolescent push for emancipation from “parental repression” — the kid just
wants to move out. Continuing the analogy, the third phase of the debate can be
recognised as the young adult searching for his roots. In this phase, the partici-
pants of the modern debate on the public domain embedded new concepts into
the debate by anchoring their use of the concepts to the external discourses the
concepts originated in.
At this point in time, however, the plain nature of the first and second phase of the
debate was gone. The contributions belonging to the third and fourth phase are
not as easily sorted and categorised as the contributions to the first and second
phase, and the phases are no longer strictly successive. This is not only because
the third and fourth phases are different aspects of the same reconstruction,
however. It is, for instance, also possible to find embedding, and even modest
examples of realisation, in some of the contributions belonging to the second
phase. When Hettinger criticised the labour justification of property he based his
analysis both on Nozick and Locke; when Litman described the romantic notion
of authorship she based her analysis both on Foucault, Woodmansee and an
early article by Boyle; and, when Boyle wrote about the treachery of images he
based his analysis on Foucault, Felix Cohen, and, at least to a certain degree,
Magritte.
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That the later phases are not as clear-cut as the earlier phases does not mean
that they are not useful in an analysis of the intellectual history of the modern
debate on the public domain. It only means that it is harder to organise the
data, that the placement of a certain author or article is ambiguous, and that the
historian should be even more modest in his claims than usual.
In the following, I am going to describe three different attempts to anchor the pub-
lic domain to other discourses. The first chapter is on an aesthetic, meaning an
opinion on the nature of information. The chapter builds on the view of authoring
inherent in Litman’s critique of the romantic notion of authorship, and discusses
the value of the public domain to creativity. More specifically, it includes a dis-
cussion on how Lewis Hyde’s anthropological study of gift exchange has been
used as a apology for the public domain. Following this, the second chapter is a
description of Yochai Benkler’s adaptation of Hyde’s aesthetic analysis of gift ex-
change in the form of an economic theory on collaborative production, while the
last chapter is a discussion on writings about the relationship between the public
domain and different theories on political participation and the public sphere.
The Aesthetic Beauty of Collaborative
Creativity
In his 1957 book “Anatomy of Criticism,” Northrop Frye wrote that “poetry can
only be made out of other poems; novels out of other novels.” A century ear-
lier Justice Joseph Story wrote the following in his opinion in the 1845 Mas-
sachusetts Circuit Court case Emerson v. Davies: “Every book in literature,
science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which
was well known and used before. [...] No man writes exclusively from his own
thoughts, unaided and uninstructed by the thoughts of others.”126 In much the
same way, John Donne, in his 1623 meditation “Devotions upon Emergent Oc-
casions,” famously wrote that “all mankind is of one author, and is one volume
[...] no man is an island, entire of itself.”127 Despite claims to the contrary,128
acknowledgement of the value of inspiration and the role of reuse in intellectual
126Emerson v. Davies et al., 8 F. Cas. 615 (1918).
127John Donne, Devotions upon Emergent Occasions, Meditation XVII, (Michigan: The Univer-
sity of Michigan Press, 1959), pp. 107-109.
128Bollier, Viral Spiral , p. 63.
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production was not a novelty of the new public domain discourse in the 1980s,
nor with the advent of the internet.
Hettinger’s “historical/social component” and Litman’s “raw material available for
other authors to use” belong to the same tradition as Frye, Story, and Donne. So
did John Perry Barlow and James Boyle when they spoke about the nature of in-
formation, as well as Jonathan Lethem when he wrote about “source hypocrisy”
in light of Lewis Hyde’s analysis of the work of art as a gift. This chapter is there-
fore about the establishment of an aesthetic within the public domain discourse.
Accordingly, I will begin this chapter with a short description of the basic analysis
of the nature of information as it was prior to the attempts to embed an anthropo-
logical analysis of gift exchange to the public domain discourse. Then I will take
a closer look at Lewis Hyde’s “gift economy,” before I turn to a discussion about
the use of Hyde within the public domain discourse and the source hypocrisy of
the market-based analyses of creativity.
The Nature of Information
In his 1992 article “A Theory of Law and Information,” James Boyle asserts that
information issues as disparate as copyright, blackmail and insider trading are
all challenged by a similar set of recurring patterns of contradictions which are
caused by the duality of information in the marketplace. On one hand, informa-
tion is a prerequisite for a competitive market. On the other hand, information
is not created (or collected, if you will) without incentives from within the same
market. This dilemma was the subject of Grossman and Stiglitz’ renowned 1980
article “On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets,” in which they
concluded that “there is a fundamental conflict between the efficiency with which
markets spread information and the incentives to aquire information.”129
In his 1994 essay “The Economy of Ideas,” John Perry Barlow argued that this
dual role of information in the marketplace causes information to be “intangible
and hard to define.” According to Barlow, information “is a natural host to para-
dox”130 because it cannot be easily described or analysed. Barlow therefore
compared information to light. To understand the nature of light, it is helpful to
“understand light as being both a particle and a wave.” In the same way, Barlow
argued, it might be helpful to view information as being both an activity, a life
form, and a relationship.
129Sanford J. Grossman and Joseph E. Stiglitz, “On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient
Markets”, The American Economic Review 70, 1980, p. 405.
130Barlow, “The Economy of Ideas”.
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Having said that, Barlow argued that the complex nature of information has been
disregarded by intellectual property law. With copyright, for instance, information
is blatantly cut in two. To Barlow, copyright is a “franchise” on the expression
(meaning the “precise turn of phrase used to convey a particular idea”131), while
the idea is seen as the “collective property of humanity.” Barlow: “The bottle
was protected, not the wine.”132 This forces information to be analysed through
a simplistic idea vs. expression dichotomy. And owing to the fact that intellectual
property is built on top of the simplification inherent in such a binary understand-
ing of information, Barlow argued, it is susceptible to error. How many of our
assumptions about information, Barlow queried, “have actually been about its
containers rather than their mysterious contents?”133
In an attempt to explain the background of this simplification, Boyle analysed
the idea-expression dichotomy in light of marketisation. In Boyle’s view, two
processes govern the typical way we try to deal with the complex nature of infor-
mation. The first process is by calling upon the image of information production
inherent in the romantic notion of authorship, which makes it easier to justify
appropriation. Based on this understanding of what can reasonably be appro-
priated, the second process is to assign — Boyle used the word “pigeonhole” —
information into stereotypes of “public” and “private.” To Boyle, the bifurcation of
books into “ideas” on one hand and “expressions” on the other originated in this
public-private dichotomy so essential to marketisation. This division gives us the
opportunity, Boyle wrote, to “give the idea (and the facts on which it is based) to
the public world and the expression to the writer, thus apparently mediating the
contradiction between public good and private greed.”134
In the following, I am going to discuss how Boyle’s and Barlow’s analyses of
(1) the idea-expression dichotomy and (2) the public-private dichotomy were ex-
panded through anchoring the analysis to Lewis Hyde’s “gift economy.”
Gift Exchange in the Relationship of Master and Apprentice
The analysis of gift exchange has a rich tradition in anthropology going all the
way back to Marcel Mauss’ 1924 essay “Essai sur le don” (The Gift: The Form
and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies). It was Lewis Hyde’s 1983 book




134Boyle, “A Theory of Law and Information”, p. 1469.
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on the public domain, however. Hyde himself did not speak explicitly about a
Langean public domain, and only mentioned intellectual property once. Anchor-
ing the public domain discourse to this anthropological analysis of gift exchange
was done by, among others, David Bollier in his 2002 book “Silent Theft,” Yochai
Benkler in his 2002 article “Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the
Firm,”135 Jonathan Lethem in his 2007 essay “The Ecstacy of Influence,” and
Lewis Hyde himself, in the afterword to a 2006 reprint of “The Gift.” Again, my
use of Hyde is not meant as an exegesis of his thoughts. Rather, I focus only on
those parts which are relevant to the public domain debate; and I describe the
interpretation of Hyde common in Bollier’s, Benkler’s, and Lethem’s writings.
In the tradition of Mauss and, among others, Marshall Sahlins, Hyde argued
that some kinds of production and distribution should be seen as a “gift ex-
change.” People live differently, Hyde wrote, “who treat a portion of their wealth
as a gift.”136 Contrary to commodity exchange, gift exchange creates a rela-
tionship between its participants. One example is the dinner ritual in which the
participants pour wine into their neighbour’s glass, and vice versa. Economi-
cally speaking not much has happened, but, Hyde writes, “society has appeared
where there was none before.”137
In the context of art, Hyde claimed that budding artists are inspired to become
artists “when their own nascent gifts are awakened by the work of a master.”138
The “awakening” of an apprentice can happen briefly, like the sudden stimulus
that might come from from seeing a masterpiece like Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa or
listening to a piano virtuoso play Rachmaninov’s third piano concert; or over a
longer period of time, like the relationship between the master and the appren-
tice. At the beginning of his career, the apprentice is taught the skills of the trade
by the master. The apprentice cannot express his gratitude to the master in any
other way than through acknowledgement and due regard, however. As such,
the apprentice, when he is ready, will show his gratitude and give back some of
what was given to him by taking on an apprentice himself. This kind of gift is
what Hyde calls a gift of transformation. The transformation is complete when
the apprentice is ready to give the gift on his own terms. Passing the gift along
is “the act of gratitude that finishes the labor.”139
135Actually, Benkler did not mention Hyde, but, rather, Mauss, Sahlins, Hagstrom, Merton, etc.
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According to Hyde, there is a group of folk tales concerning this labour of grat-
itude. One of these tales is the story about “The Shoemaker and the Elves.”
The story goes like this: One night, the shoemaker is visited by two elves, who
makes one pair of shoes from leather the shoemaker has cut. The shoes are
sewn perfectly, “not a stitch is out of place.” Hyde continues:
The shoes are such a masterpiece that the first customer to appear in the
morning pays handsomely for them, and the cobbler has enough money to
buy leather for two pair of shoes. That night he cuts the leather and goes
to bed. Again in the morning the shoes are made, and again they sell for
such a price as to afford the leather for four pairs of shoes. In this way the
shoemaker soon prospers.140
At some point, however, the shoemaker and his wife becomes curious as to
who it is that are helping them. They decide to leave a candle burning and hide
behind some coats. At midnight, they see the elves enter the room and get to
work. Hyde continues:
In the morning the wife says to the shoemaker, “The little men have made us
rich and we should show our gratitude for this. They’re running about with
nothing on and might freeze! I’m going to make them each a shirt, coat,
jacket, trousers and a pair of stockings. Why don’t you make them each a
pair of little shoes.” The cobbler willingly agrees, and one night when the
clothes are finished he lays them out on the bench in place of the leather.
He and his wife hide behind the coats to watch. The elves are surprised
and pleased to find the clothes. They put them on and sing—
We’re sleek, we’re fine, we’re out the door,
We shan’t be cobblers any more!
And they dance around the room and away. They never return, but every-
thing continues to go well with the shoemaker and he prospers at whatever
he takes in hand.141
Just as with the apprentice and the master, the tale describes a gift of trans-
formation. The elves carries with them the gift of talent, and gives it to the
shoemaker. “The process is always a bit mysterious,” writes Hyde, and it is no
surprise that it begins while he is asleep. Hyde:
You work at a task, you work and work and still it won’t come right. Then,
when you’re not even thinking about it, while spading the garden or step-
ping into the bus, the whole thing pops into your head, the missing grace is
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But it does not end there. The gift must be passed along. As mentioned above,
the transformation is not complete until the apprentice is ready to give the gift on
his own terms. In the story, this is manifested by the nakedness of the elves. The
shoemaker and his wife makes clothes for the elves, which then represents the
passing along of the gift. Clothing something is a kind of acknowledgment, as I
mentioned in Part II, it is “like giving it a name.”143 Without giving the gift away,
it cannot be fully realised. Hyde: “[T]hose who will not acknowledge gratitude
or who refuse to labor in its service neither free their gifts nor really come to
possess them.”144
Holding on to the gift thus terminates the gift exchange. The elves are freed
when the cobbler gives as a gift to the elves the very first pair of shoes he
created himself (all the other shoes were created by the elves). If the cobbler
had not given away the shoes, the elves would not have been freed. Hyde wrote:
“What is given away feeds again and again, while what is kept feeds only once
and leaves us hungry.”145
Source Hypocrisy — Stoppering the Bottle
The essence of Hyde’s analysis of gift exchange is that certain kinds of human
interaction will only flourish, or perhaps even be possible at all, if an exchange
of gifts is at the center of the interaction. As mentioned in Part I, the Englishman
who placed the Indian pipe on his mantelpiece took the pipe out of circulation
and thereby obstructed formation of social bonds between the Englishman and
the Indians. Accordingly, it is the reciprocal nature of the gift exchange that
brings people together.
To Hyde, this is especially true with art. “Where there is no gift,” Hyde wrote,
“there is no art.”146 Consequently, the artist who does not “free the elves” by giv-
ing something back destroys the gift exchange. Jonatham Lethem argued that
the work of the Walt Disney Company is a good example of this. To Lethem,
Disney is “the most pernicious source hypocrites of all time.” A large number of
works in Disney’s portfolio draws directly upon the works of others. Lethem men-
tioned both “Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs, Fantasia, Pinocchio, Dumbo,
Bambi, Song of the South, Cinderella, Alice in Wonderland, Robin Hood, Peter
Pan, Lady and the Tramp, Mulan, Sleeping Beauty, The Sword in the Stone,
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The Jungle Book, [and] Treasure Planet.” But Disney does not acknowledge this
and, according to Lethem, does not give back any of that which has been given
to them. Rather, Disney threatens legal action whenever someone tries to reuse
some of their characters. Lethem wrote that “for every James Joyce or Woody
Guthrie or Martin Luther King Jr., or Walt Disney, who gathered a constellation of
voices in his work, there may seem to be some corporation or literary estate ea-
ger to stopper the bottle: cultural debts flow in, but they don’t flow out.”147 Disney,
to use Hyde’s words, removes the indian “pipe” — Dumbo, Bambi, Pinocchio,
etc. — from the gift circulation and “sets it on the mantelpiece.”148
To Hyde, not feeling any gratitude and not acknowledging the gift of the elves
— the muses in the shoemaker story — is narcissism. Hyde: “The narcissist
feels his gifts come from himself.”149 This view is similar to Emily Nussbaum,
who described the narcissistic artist as follows: “For so many artists, the act of
creativity is intended as a Napoleonic imposition of one’s uniqueness upon the
universe - apre`s moi le de´luge150 of copycats!”151
Hyde explicitly stated, however, that the work of art was not necessarily de-
stroyed if it was sold in the marketplace. Commercialisation is not exclusively
narcissistic. Some parts of the work of art can survive as a gift even though the
work itself is recast as a commodity. More accurately, then, his argument was
that a work of art requires a certain degree of gift exchange. Art cannot exist
purely as a commodity. If we deny the gift aspect of the work of art, we run the
risk of destroying it completely.
Hyde’s analysis of gift exchange can thus be seen as an attempt to criticise ne-
oliberal ideology for advocating a Manichaean world view in which the market is
in the light and anything outside of the market is in darkness. This is remarkably
similar to Boyle’s view in his 2001 article “The Second Enclosure Movement,” in
which he wrote that “there is no real discussion of the world outside of intellectual
property.”152
To Hyde, assessing the worth of something based on its exchange value in the
marketplace is just too simple. First, the economics is incomplete. In addition
to exchange in the marketplace, Hyde argued, there exists several kinds of gift
147Lethem, “The ecstasy of influence - A plagiarism”, p. 65.
148Hyde, The Gift , p. 3.
149Ibid., pp. 54-55.
150“After Me Come the Floods,” normally attributed Louis XIV.
151Emily Nussbaum, “Urban Appetites, The Collected Poems of Kenneth Koch”, 2005. http:
//www.nytimes.com/2005/12/11/books/review/11nussbaum.html? r=1&sq=napoleonic%20
imposition&st=cse&scp=1&pagewanted=print (May 11, 2009).
152Boyle, “The Second Enclosure Movement”, p. 57.
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exchange. Just like market-based exchange, gift exchange is a social structure
that regulates ownership to and use of a particular set of assets. In a number
of cases, Hyde argued, gift exchange is — also economically — a more efficient
organising principle of production and distribution than the marketplace. Second,
economics cannot measure all that is valuable to us. Not everything can be
counted and priced. A certain object may have “worth” even though it has no
exchange “value.”
This bisection into the commodity part and the gift part of the work of art un-
derlying Hyde’s criticism of marketisation is similar to Barlow’s and Boyle’s idea-
expression dichotomy, but his analysis of the nature of the gift part of the work of
art is far more complex than Barlow’s and Boyle’s. Hence, it was as an analysis
of the gift part of art that Hyde’s work was incorporated into the public domain
discourse. In this process the analysis was extended from Hyde’s analysis of art
to an analysis of knowledge and information more generally.
Similar to Hyde’s argument that a partial commodification not necessarily threat-
ens the gift aspect of the work of art, few, if any, of the participants in the modern
debate on the public domain has ever argued that knowledge and information
cannot be appropriated and commodified at all. Edward Samuels criticised the
early contributions to the public domain debate in his 1993 article “The Public
Domain in Copyright,” and argued that “there is a fallacy in jumping from the
observation that no work is totally original to the conclusion that no work is at
all original, or that we can’t find some originality even in modest works.”153 Such
an unconditional and absolute argument had not been made within the first and
second phase of the debate, however, and with the incorporation of Hyde’s anal-
ysis of gift exchange, the disapproval of such absolute claims only grew stronger.
On the contrary, all the participants in the debate seem to have acknowledged
the idea-expression dichotomy. What they react to is the tendency to ignore the
“idea”-side (i.e. the public domain), and that the work of art can — and should —
be fully appropriated and commodified. To Boyle, this threat to the public domain
comes from a “second enclosure movement” enclosing the intangible commons
of the mind.154
Barlow described this shift as a result of the intellectual property industry’s re-
sponse to digitisation and the internet. The prospect of the “bottles” becoming
redundant because information could be shared without physical objects like
books and CDs, Barlow argued, caused the intellectual property industry to re-
153Samuels, “The Public Domain in Copyright Law”.
154Boyle, “The Second Enclosure Movement”, p. 37. The second enclosure movement is the
successor to the English enclosure movement of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
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spond by claiming ownership of more and more “wine,” thus shifting the tradi-
tional balance between idea and expression. Barlow:
What was previously considered a common human resource, distributed
among the minds and libraries of the world, as well as the phenomena of
nature herself, is now being fenced and deeded.155
Contrary to Barlow, the later Hyde, Boyle, and Lethem found the source of this
shift in a simplification of the analysis of production and distribution to a market
vs. non-market dichotomy. In this simple market-based analysis of production,
the gift aspect of the production of knowledge and information is blatantly ig-
nored. Due to the primacy of the neoliberal ideology, Hyde argued, a number of
objects that have “worth” are trivialised and underpriced because they have no
“value” in the marketplace.
In the new 2006 afterword to “The Gift,” Hyde maintained that “the ever-expanding
reach of copyright has removed more and more art and ideas from the public do-
main,” and that “this period of market triumphalism” has in sum “seen a success-
ful move to commercialize a long list of things once thought to have no price, and
to enclose common holdings, both natural and cultural, that we used to assume
no one was allowed to take private.”156
The Collaborative Aesthetic of Public Domain
This analysis of the nature of information is closely associated with the decon-
structive phase of the modern debate on the public domain, and especially the
romantic notion of authorship. At the same time, the embedding of notions from
information economics as well as certain theories from within the anthropolog-
ical study of gift exchange can be said to have developed the analysis into a
theory on the nature of sharing — a collaborative aesthetic. The core of this
aesthetic is still the simple, and mostly negatory, argument that “the [romantic]
author vision blinds us to the importance of the commons—to the importance
of the raw material from which information products are constructed;”157 but in
addition to this a more meticulous analysis was incorporated through the use of
ideas from Hyde, Frye, Story, Donne, etc.
As Frye wrote, human beings do not create ex nihilo, out of nothing. “Just as a
new scientific discovery manifests something that was already latent in the order
155Barlow, “The Economy of Ideas”.
156Hyde, The Gift , p. 293.
157Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens, p. xiv.
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of nature and at the same time is logically related to the total structure of the
existing science,” Frye wrote, “so the new poem manifests something that was
already latent in the order of words.”158 Claiming “authorship” of knowledge and
information is therefore a simplification, disrespectful of the collaborative nature
of creation. Barlow: “They act as though these ideas appeared in splendid de-
tachment from all previous human thought.”159 Hyde explicitly acknowledged the
fact that a part of the work of art can be commodified without destroying the pro-
duction of knowledge and information, however. It was the source simplification
of commodification that was criticised. An unconditional commodification ignor-
ing the gift aspect run the risk of destroying production itself. After all,“ideas do
not circulate freely when they are treated as commodities.”160
This argument is similar to the argument from the deconstructive phase of the
debate in that it can be described as a utilitarian justification based on a simplistic
notion that “more” is “better,” and, correspondingly, that a strong public domain
would increase the output of production. The conclusion that can be drawn
from this analysis is therefore that an excessive marketisation is economically
inefficient. The analysis of the collaborative aesthetic is more specific, however.
In this view, economic efficiency is only one parameter. There exist something
which have worth without having exchange value in the marketplace: “A young
poet can stand the same supper of barley soup and bread, night after night,”
Hyde wrote, “if he is on a walking tour of Italy and much in love of beauty.” To the
young poet, beauty is more important than economic efficiency. As such, “artists
whose gifts are strong, accessible, and coming over into their work may, as
Marshall Sahlins says of hunters and gatherers, ’have affluent economies, their
absolute poverty notwithstanding.”’161 The argument was therefore expanded
from incorporating only an analysis of whether art would be created to what kind
of art would be created. Instead of the simplistic economic parameter “more,”
it is argued that a public domain-based production results in “better” and more
“beautiful” products. After all, Hyde wrote that there is no “art” where there is
no “gift.” Inherent in this argument is a normative view of “art” not only as a
technical label for objects like paintings, sculptures, poems, etc., but also as a
qualifier requiring the work of art to have a certain beauty and emotional power.
The participants in the public domain debate did not argue that nothing would
have been created without a public domain. The two most important arguments
that can be drawn from the collaborative aesthetics that was created by incor-
158Frye, Anatomy of Criticism - Four Essays, p. 97.
159Barlow, “The Economy of Ideas”.
160Hyde, The Gift , p. 84.
161Ibid., p. 282.
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porating the tradition of Frye, Story, and Donne, as well as the analysis of gift
exchange represented by Hyde, into the public domain discourse, are (1) less
will be created without a strong public domain, and (2) that which is created is
not as beautiful. As I will get back to in Part IV, this aesthetic was later extended
to include a view of the process itself as valueable to society.
The Economics of Commons-Based Peer
Production
One of the most explicit descriptions of a gift economy and its relationship to
the public domain was Yochai Benkler’s analysis of “commons-based peer pro-
duction.” As such, my second example of how the public domain discourse was
expanded by embedding certain concepts from other discourses is closely as-
sociated to the first. The approach is more economic than anthropological or
aesthetic, however. It thereby expands the public domain discourse with argu-
ments within an economic frame of reference.
In his 2002 article “Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm,” Ben-
kler described a new production mode that came into existence with the advent
of internet. To him, it made “sense to focus on cultural or sociological character-
istics of peer communities as a central explanation of peer production,”162 and he
mentioned both classic anthropological treatment of the subject like Mauss and
Sahlins, newer treatments of gift exchange in other areas like Warren Hagstrom’s
and Robert Merton’s analyses of gifts in science, and more recent applications
of similar theories like in Eric Raymond’s 1997 essay “The Cathedral and the
Bazaar.”163 Benkler chose to base his analysis on an economic framework,
however, because he saw it as important to “establish its baseline plausibility
as a sustainable and valuable mode of production within the most widely used
relevant analytic framework.”164
162Yochai Benkler, “Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm”, Yale Law Journal
112, 2002, p. 400.
163Eric Raymond, “The Cathedral and the Bazaar”, 1997. http://www.catb.org/∼esr/writings/
cathedral-bazaar/cathedral-bazaar/index.html (May 11, 2009).
164Benkler, “Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm”, p. 401.
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The Nature of the Firm
Because he saw economics as the “most widely used relevant analytic frame-
work,” Benkler began with Ronald Coase’s classic analysis of production.165 Ac-
cording to Coase, there exists two modes of production. First, production can be
organised in the marketplace, using the price mechanism. Second, production
can be organised within a firm. With no transaction costs, the market is always
the most efficient mode of production. To Coase, the reason firms emerge —
a question Benkler asked in the following way: “Why clusters of individuals op-
erate under the direction of an entrepreneur, a giver of commands, rather than
interacting purely under the guidance of prices”166 — is that there will always
be transaction costs associated with a marked mode of production (i.e. gather-
ing information about suppliers, organising a bidding process, and so on). This
implies that some products might be more efficiently manufactured within the
coordinated sphere of a firm, which is defined as a “system of relationships
which comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an
entrepreneur.”167 Also, Coase noted, improvements within the managerial tech-
nique tend to increase the size of firms, while a reduction of the transaction costs
tends to reduce the size of firms.
Benkler’s argument was that there existed a third mode of production, which
he called “commons-based peer production.” This mode of production exists
within the digitally networked environment, and is characterised by small or
large groups of people not following “market prices or managerial commands,”
but, rather, a diverse cluster of motivational drives and social signals.168 In
his 1997 essay “The Cathedral and the Bazaar,” Raymond described the dif-
ference between a firm-based production mode and peer production by labelling
the production modes “cathedral” and “bazaar.” To Raymond, software could
either be built “like cathedrals, carefully crafted by individual wizards or small
bands of mages working in splendid isolation”; or more or less “emerge” from a
community that “seemed to resemble a great babbling bazaar of differing agen-
das and approaches.”169 To Benkler, free software, which was what Raymond
wrote about, is an important and highly visible example of this mode of pro-
duction, but not the only one. Contrary to the property centered market-based
165Coase won the Nobel Price in Economics in 1991 for his work on externalities and transac-
tion costs, especially his 1937 article “The Nature of the Firm” and his 1960 article “The Problem
of Social Cost.”
166Benkler, “Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm”, p. 400.
167Ronald Coase, “The Nature of the Firm”, Economica 4, 1937, p. 393.
168Benkler, “Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm”.
169Raymond, “The Cathedral and the Bazaar”.
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and managerial-based modes of production, commons-based peer production
is centered around commonly available material: “The inputs and outputs of the
process are shared, freely or conditionally, in an institutional form that leaves
them equally available for all to use as they choose at their individual discre-
tion.”170
It is interesting to note that instead of using the term “public domain” and arguing
that the information should be “free as air to common use,” Benkler used words
like “shared” and “equally available for all to use at their discretion.” This is also
the reason he called this mode of production “commons-based,” and not “public
domain-based.” Commons, Benkler argued, are characterised by two parame-
ters: (1) Whether the resource is common to all or just to a well defined-subset
of people; and (2) Whether the resource is regulated or not. If the resource is
only common to a small subset, however, it might more correctly be identified as
a “common property regime.” In the case of commons-based peer production,
the resource must either be common to all or at least to a large subset of people.
Also, any regulation that inhibits or constrains the use of the resource must be
symmetric among all users for the resource to be a proper commons.171 Ben-
kler expressed this clearly in his 2006 book “The Wealth of Networks,” which,
at least to a certain extent, can be seen as an elaboration on his analysis of
commons-based peer production in the 2002 article “Coase’s Penguin”: “The
salient characteristic of commons, as opposed to property, is that no single per-
son has exclusive control over the use and disposition of any particular resource
in the commons.”172
Accordingly, Benkler’s commons-based peer production is a production mode in
which the resources flow freely inside a heterogeneous and decentralised group
of people. This group of people is not a rigid, hierarchical structure like that of
a firm, but a flexible and open-ended network. It goes without saying that pro-
duction is often organised in some way or another, but this does not diminish
the flexibility of the system due to the fact that the resources are common to all.
If participants on a free software project disagrees with the people in charge of
the project, for example, they might create their own project and build upon the
source code that has already been developed. This insures against two risks
identified by Raymond. First, people participating in such peer production does
not have to, as Raymond put it, “spend their days grinding away for pay at pro-
grams which they neither need nor love.”173 According to Raymond, the fact that
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decisions about production are made by the participants and not by a supervi-
sor insures against unnecessary production — decisions about production are
based on real need. Raymond’s first rule of Bazaar production of software is
therefore that “every good work of software starts by scratching a developer’s
personal itch.”174 Second, peer production often involves more people, which
means that the product will be reviewed by more people. This increases the
likelyhood of finding and correcting errors. Raymond: “Given enough eyeballs,
all bugs are shallow.”175
Avoiding the Tragedy
According to the “Tragedy of the Commons” trope, as I discussed in Part II, a pro-
duction mode like this is quixotic and unfeasible. The “participants” would appear
to be participating, while their real intention would be to freeride other people’s
work. As such, any attempts at commons-based peer production would collapse.
But, Benkler argued, a number of examples shows that this is not the case. In
addition to a large number of free software projects, as mentioned above, Ben-
kler discussed the “participatory internet” web sites NASA Clickworkers project,
Wikipedia, Slashdot and Project Gutenberg. All of these are commons-based
peer production projects, which according to the “Tragedy of the Commons”
trope should have collapsed a long time ago. Instead, Benkler argued, these
examples show (A) that human beings are not only motivated by economic in-
centives, and that certain features of the project (B) will enhance participation to
such a degree as to thwart the free rider-problem.
(A) The problem with the “Tragedy of the Commons” trope, according to Benkler,
is that is has misconstrued the role of economic incentives. To begin with, it
ignores glory. As Camden claimed in the 1774 House of Lords case Donaldson
v. Beckett, “Glory is the Reward of Science [...] It was not for Gain, that Bacon,
Newton, Milton, Locke, instructed and delighed the World”176 A more recent crit-
icism of the “tragic” analysis of incentives can be found in Eben Moglen’s 1999
essay “Anarchism Triumphant,” where he introduced a corollary to Faraday’s law.
Faraday’s law is the law of induction. If you wrap a coil of wire around a magnet
and spins the magnet, current flows through the wire. But, as Moglen noted, “we
don’t ask what the incentive is for the electrons to leave home.”177 Rather, the
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current results from an “emergent property of the system.” As such, Moglen’s
Metaphorical Corollary to Faraday’s Law says that:
If you wrap the Internet around every person on the planet and spin the
planet, software flows in the network. It’s an emergent property of con-
nected human minds that they create things for one another’s pleasure and
to conquer their uneasy sense of being too alone.178
(B) Besides the fact that human beings are motived by more than just economic
incentives, Benkler identified three main reasons these projects worked: (1) That
they were modular, i.e. that they could be broken up into little pieces that can
be produced independently of each other; (2) that the granularity of these pieces
were flexible enough to “accomodate variously sized contributions,” i.e. that at
least some of the pieces were small enough to “capture contributions from large
numbers of contributors whose motivation level will not sustain anything more
than quite small efforts towards the project;”179 as well as (3) that the modules
could be easily integrated in the end.
The Distributed Proofreading project, a side project to Project Gutenberg, is an
appropriate example. First, Distributed Proofreading split each book up in indi-
vidual pages that could be proofread independently; second, proofreading one
page was a small enough effort to attract a large number of contributors and
the flexibility was preserved simply by letting more enthusiatic contributors read
more than one page at a time; and third, the proofread pages was integrated
easily by being automatically added to the finished book.180 The success of the
Distributed Proofreading project is, to a large extent, owing to the fact that the
proofreading was broken into single page modules. The single page modules
made it a lot easier to get involved than with the original approach, in which one
module encompassed one book. The difference between proofreading a sin-
gle page and proofreading a whole book illustrates the importance of granularity
well.
The Economics of Non-Regulated Cooperation
At this point, it might not ble clear how Benkler’s approach is different from the
collaborative aesthetic. As I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, Ben-
kler himself acknowledged that an analysis of commons-based peer produc-
tion could reasonably be based on the anthropology of gift exchange. Contrary
178Ibid.
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to the “production” analysed by the collaborative aesthetic, however, Benkler’s
commons-based peer production emerged with the development of internet. It
can certainly be argued that some sort of commons-based peer production,
meaning people creating something without following “market prices or manage-
rial commands,” also existed before the advent of internet. Most of the properties
of such creation can be recognised in non-commercial science and art. But, in
non-commercial science and art the activity is not really “production.” It is better
described by the word “creation,” which calls for a small semantical digression.
In the following I am going to distinguish between two kinds of production: “cre-
ation” and “fabrication.” This distinction is similar to Hyde’s distinction between
“labour” and “work.” Work, Hyde wrote, “is what we do by the hour. It begins
and ends at a specific time and, if possible, we do it for money.”181 His examples
of “work” include “welding car bodies on an assembly line [...] washing dishes,
computing taxes, walking the rounds in a psychiatric ward, picking asparagus.”
Labour, on the other hand, “sets its own pace.” If we are paid it can still be labour,
but it is harder to quantify. Hyde:
’Getting the program’ in AA is a labor. It is likewise apt to speak of ’mourning
labor’: when a loved one dies, the soul undergoes a period of travail, a
change that draws energy. Writing a poem, raising a child, developing a new
calculus, resolving a neurosis, invention in all forms — these are labors.182
This means that the “production” inherent in non-commercial science and art,
which I have called “creation,” is similar to what Hyde labelled “labour.” On that
account, the activities of non-commercial science and art is precisely what is
analysed in the collaborative aesthetic I described in the first chapter of Part III.
Benkler’s commons-based peer production, on the other hand, is an analysis of
a mode of “production” I called “fabrication;” which is similar to Hyde’s “work.”
When Benkler chose to analyse this production in light of Coase’s economic
theory on the nature of the firm, because it was the “most widely used relevant
analytic framework,” Benkler introduced a separate analysis of the public do-
main, different from the collaborative aesthetic. Benkler is therefore correct to
say that “commons-based peer production” exists exclusively within the digitally
networked environment.
Still, there exists a certain degree of overlapping. The most evident example
of work is Project Gutenberg. Even though the content is definitely creative, the
181Hyde, The Gift , p. 51.
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activity of scanning, proofreading, and uploading can only be described as work.
This is also the case with the NASA Clickworkers project. Wikipedia, on the other
hand, is more complicated. As long as it is strictly an encyclopedia, collecting
information to be published on the web site is work in much the same manner
as Warren Hagstrom described the writing of text books. Writing a text book,
Hagstrom argued, is work done for pay, while research is labour done expecting
honour and respect in return.183 This means that writing for Wikipedia is labour
when it includes a creative aspect. Mostly, however, Wikipedia is work. The
same is true for open source software projects. A large part of the typical open
source software project is work, even though some parts of it involves creative
labour.
The Political Role of the Public Sphere
Some of the most interesting cases of anchoring are when the term “public
domain” is actually used verbatim within the external discourse, but not in the
Langean sense. One example of this is in the political context. In his 1993 ar-
ticle “The Public Domain,” Algis Mickunas did not write about a Langean public
domain, and is not a part of the modern debate on the public domain as such.
Rather, he wrote about what I am going to call a “Mickunian” public domain, and
his analysis is a rather straightforward example of a public sphere-tradition that
has been embedded into the public domain discourse. To Mickunas, the public
domain is a prerequisite for a democratic political society: “Autonomous freedom
implies a life under freely posited, debated, and rationally examined rules. Such
an achievement is a matter of public debate and consensus.”184 The Mickunian
public domain is therefore a public sphere “in which all members of a community
participate in the establishment and maintenance of [...] the rules by which they
will govern their lives and deal with the environment.”185 Anchoring the Langean
public domain to such analyses of political participation and the public sphere
183Warren O. Hagstrom, “Gift giving as an organizing principle in science”. In: Science in Con-
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The Open University Press, 1982.
184Algis Mickunas, “The Public Domain”. In: Open Institutions, ed. by John W. Murphy and
Dennis L. Peck, Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1993, pp. 177–192, p. 181.
185Ibid., pp. 180-181.
70 Free as Air to Common Use — Part III
is an attempt to create a case for the public domain by exhibiting how valuable
access to knowledge and information is to a democratic society.
In this chapter, I am going to focus on the two most important political theories
the public domain has been associated with. The first one is Walter Benjamin’s
analysis of “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” which
illustrates the difference between consumption and participation. The second
one is analyses of the public sphere, which relates the public domain and the
political conversation of a democracy.
The Different Modes of Participation
In his 1935 essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,”
Walter Benjamin wrote about the transformation of art due to the introduction of
mechanical reproduction. The essay was written while Benjamin lived in exile in
Paris, and it can be interpreted as a rather desperate attempt to create a marxian
aesthetic that would be useless to the nazis.186 Routinely, especially within the
context of the public domain discourse, this historical context has been blatantly
disregarded. It is one of those texts, like the Bible, in which we never seem to
settle on an interpretation. It is applauded, admired, dismissed, and despised,
seemingly all at once. The fact that several inconsistent revisions were published
did not mitigate this motley reception. My aim is therefore not to do a historical
exegesis of Benjamin’s essay. Rather, my description of the essay is intended to
be as similar to the typical interpretation within the modern debate on the public
domain as possible.
To Benjamin, the mechanically reproduced work of art is given meaning through
the encounter between the work of art itself and its audience. This encounter
was itself a result of the invention of mechanical reproduction. Traditionally, the
work of art was a ceremonial object surrounded by aura and “destined to serve
in a cult.”187 It was authentic, and had a unique existence at “the place where it
happens to be.”188
Contrary to this, the mechanically reproduced work of art is unoriginal, and the
reproduction replaces the unique existence with a plurality of copies. The repro-
duction has no aura, and looking for the “authentic” copy does not make sense.
186Torodd Karlsten, “Walter Benjamin”. In: Kunstverket i reproduksjonsalderen, ed. by Walter
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The reproduction therefore causes what Benjamin calls a “tremendous shatter-
ing of tradition.” Not only is the work of art released from the domain of tradition
through a “liquidation of the traditional value of the cultural heritage,”189 the dis-
tance between the work of art and its beholder is also reduced. Traditionally, the
beholder would have to come to the work of art. Through mechanical reproduc-
tion, the work of art comes to the beholder. And in “permitting the reproduction to
meet the beholder or listener in his own particular situation,” Benjamin wrote, “it
reactivates the object reproduced.”190 In Benjamin’s view, meaning is no longer
absolute. Rather, the work of art is given meaning within the context of the
situation in which it is being observed.
To Benjamin, the transition from traditional production to mechanical reproduc-
tion constitutes a complete transformation of the work of art. When the question
of “authenticity” ceases to be applicable to the work of art, Benjamin wrote, the
“total function of art is reversed.” He continued: “Instead of being based on
ritual, it begins to be based on another practice—politics.”191 Based on this un-
derstanding of the political function of the mechanically reproduced work of art,
Benjamin offered two conceivable — but conflicting — ways to understand it.
The first take on this encounter between art and its audience is that meaning is
presented to the onlooker. This obviously raises the question of who is present-
ing meaning, but it is irrelevant to my use of the dichotomy whether this is done
by an authoritarian regime or some sort of Gramscian cultural hegemony. Suf-
fice it to say, that someone or some social structure, whichever it is, endeavors
to reduce the uncertainty about the meaning of a work of art through guiding the
beholder. Thus, the work of art is consumed. One example of this is captions to
photographs, which soon after the invention of photography became obligatory
in illustrated magazines. Even more explicit guidance can be seen in film, where
“the meaning of each single picture appears to be prescribed by the sequence
of all preceding ones.”192 In this view, the ancient lament “that the masses seek
distraction whereas art demands concentration from the spectator” is true. Art
is something that happened to the spectator, it “hit [him] like a bullet.” Benjamin
illustrates this view with a quote by Duhamel, who calls the movie “a pastime
for helots, a diversion for uneducated, wretched, worn-out creatures who are
consumed by their worries, a spectacle which requires no concentration and
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The second take on the encounter between art and its audience is that meaning
can be created by the onlooker — the onlooker participates. In this view, the
distracted mass is not hit like a bullet. Rather, the distracted mass “absorbs
the work of art.” The onlooker is an active participant — she is, as I will get
back to in Part IV, a “tinkerer.” Benjamin illustrated this participation through a
comparison with architecture. After seeing the building, you enter it. Buildings
are both perceived and used. It is not apparent, however, how this comparison
illuminates participation. One cannot “enter” a picture or a movie in the same
way as one enters a building, nor “participate” in a building. Nevertheless, a
likely interpretation is that the meaning of a building is created through its use.
The use of the building is therefore a source to its meaning. In the same way,
Benjamin argued, it is the “use” of non-architectural art which is the source to its
meaning.
The participation Benjamin wrote about was an “interpretive participation,” how-
ever. It is similar to the kind of participation inherent in Julie Cohen’s description
of how the open internet “enables the creation of meaning [...] Not bits, not
abstract, disembodied information that has independent properties of flow, but
meaning.”194 Benjamin has been criticised for implying that the audience “partic-
ipate” even when they sit silently in a dark movie theater, but if interpretation is
also participation it is certainly possible to argue that even the moviegoer partic-
ipates in the creation of meaning.
Another kind of participation is a “generative participation,” in which to participate
is to be a part of the production itself. To Benjamin the abundance of opportu-
nities to publish was the core of generative participation: “At any moment the
reader is ready to turn into a writer.”195
Participation in the Networked Age
It is the basic insight of the difference between consumption and participation, as
well as the ensuing analysis of interpretive and generative participation, which
has been used in the public domain debate. The participants in this debate
have not really written about mechanical reproduction, however. Rather, they
have written about the work of art in what could perhaps be called an “age of
unlimited duplication.” Sunder: “The Age of Mechanical Reproduction is yielding
to the Age of Electronic Participation.”196 Benkler therefore argued that Benjamin
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overlooked the barriers that were erected through the introduction of mechanical
reproduction: “The barrier of production costs, production values, and the star
system that came along with them, replaced the iconic role of the unique work
of art with new, but equally high barriers to participation in making culture.”197 In
Benkler’s view, the insights derived from Benjamin’s article were not necessarily
true in the age of mechanical reproduction, but they are becoming increasingly
correct as the capabilities provided by digital media have begun to grind down
these barriers.
Until now, all I have written about Benjamin and the use of his analysis within
the public domain discourse has been equally true for aesthetics and politics.
As I mentioned in the first chapter of Part III, however, I am going to write about
the participatory aesthetic, which certainly also builds on Benjamin’s analysis of
participation, in Part IV. My focus here is the use of Benjamin to analyse the
value of the public domain in a political context.
In his 2006 book “The Wealth of Networks,” Benkler argued that Benjamin’s es-
say is “one of the only instances of critical theory that took an optimistic view
of the emergence of popular culture in the twentieth century as a potentially lib-
erating turn.”198 This optimism has certainly been sustained through some of
these contributions within the modern debate on the public domain. One exam-
ple is the Cohen quote from above, where what she called “the open Internet”
enables “the creation of meaning.”199 This is similar to Benjamin’s interpretive
participation, even though it is not clear how internet changed the possibilities
to participate in the creation of meaning. Generative participation has certainly
been facilitated by the technological innovations in the last decades of the twenti-
eth century, but it was not generative participation Sunder wrote about when she
argued that we were approaching the “Age of Electronic Participation.” One pos-
sible interpretation is that the increase in generative participation has prompted
a rich profusion of new works of art, and, moreover, that this cornucopia of
meaning has revealed the traditional sources of meaning and sparked increased
participation in interpretation, i.e. the creation of meaning. Sunder: “Revealing
the multivocality of the text invites the question of what other worlds exist and
are possible.”200 The basic properties of this new situation is illustrated well in
a quote from Andrew Keen’s dystopian 2007 book “The Cult of the Amateur,”
although he did not share the optimism: “With more and more of the information
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online unedited, unverified, and unsubstantiated, we will have no choice but to
read everything with a sceptical eye.”201
It is not evident that the age of unlimited duplication is different in kind to the age
of mechanical reproduction. After all, Benjamin also wrote about both interpre-
tive and generative participation. It is therefore possible to argue that the “Age of
Electronic Participation” is only different in degree to the age of mechanical re-
production. To Benkler, however, even if the change is only a change in degree,
it is significant enough to be seen as revolutionary:
We are in the midst of a quite basic transformation in how we perceive the
world around us, and how we act, alone and in concert with others, to shape
our own understanding of the world we occupy and that of others with whom
we share it.202
A Reconstructed Public Sphere
Just like the anthropological study of gift exchange and the economic study of the
nature of the firm have rich traditions from which the participants in the public
domain debate has tried to poach certain concepts and notions, there exists
a rich tradition in political science studying the role and nature of the “public
sphere” in a democracy. The most influential analysis within this tradition is,
arguably, Ju¨rgen Habermas’ 1962 study “The Structural Transformation of the
Public Sphere.”
To Habermas, the “bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the
sphere of private people come together as a public.”203 In a general sense, it is
therefore similar to what I labelled the Mickunian public domain in the beginning
of this chapter, which is, in short, a political sphere in which autonomous and
equal persons meet and discuss the laws that govern their lives. To Mickunas,
the principles of a democratic political society “require that the sole sources of
rules is the public covenant.”204 To a certain degree, the argument is similar
to Raymond’s argument on the value of more people participating in peer pro-
duction. The more people participating in the political process, the better the
outcome will be. It can therefore be argued that the epigram “Given enough
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eyeballs, all bugs are shallow” is just as essential in a political context as in an
economic context.
In Mickunas’ uncompromising style, this means that a society in which every
person is not an autonomous participant, is not a democracy. The aristocratic
argument that “no progress could be achieved if decisions were left to the mul-
titude of individual whims”205 did not bite on Mickunas. In a situation where the
individual is not independent, Mickunas argued, “one should speak of power
confrontations and not politics.”206 Similarly, Habermas argued that “the public
sphere of civil society stood or fell with the principle of universal access. A pub-
lic sphere from which specific groups would be eo ipso excluded was less than
merely incomplete; it was not a public sphere at all.”207
According to Debora Halbert, such a public sphere is connected to the Langean
public domain, but coming from an intellectual property law discourse the Langean
public domain has not “explicitly been linked to the larger theory of the public
sphere.”208 On the other hand, Halbert continues, the public domain has not
been a subject in public sphere theories either. Instead, “public sphere theories
tends to take the circulation of ideas as a given.”209
The general trend within the public sphere-tradition is more pessimistic than the
optimism I argued can be found within the public domain debate and Benkler
argued can be found in Benjamin. To Habermas, for example, the public sphere
was more or less extinct. It was a condition for the creation of a kind of society
that subsequently destroyed it. Habermas: “With the help of [the principle of the
public sphere], which according to its own idea was opposed to all domination,
a political order was founded whose social basis did not make domination su-
perfluous after all.”210 In the words of Eva Hemmungs Wirte´n, the technological
innovations of the twentieth century was seen as “damaging and destructive, [...]
incapable of empowering the passive consumer.”211 It might therefore seem to
be contradictory that theories on the public sphere have been used to give sub-
stance to an optimistic analysis of the public domain. Some of the pessimism
“pulled through” into the public domain debate, however. In his 2001 book “Copy-
rights and Copywrongs,” Siva Vaidhyanathan argued that the structural transfor-
mation of the public sphere during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which
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was the subject for Habermas’ study, coincide with the transformation of copy-
right: “A cycle has developed. The corruptions of copyright have enforced, and
been enforced by, the erosions of the public sphere.”212 Throughout the last half
of the twentieth century, Vaidhyanathan wrote, public opinion has been marked
by “steady centralization and corporization of information and access.”213
Over the six years between 2001 and 2007, this rather gloomy outlook turned
into a more optimistic one. In his 2007 article “The Anarchist in the Coffee
House,” Vaidhyanathan analyses the Free Culture Movement, which he claims
has the potential to “deploy, leverage, and spread liberal values into spaces that
have been overrun by a proprietarian ideology.”214 As such, “[t]he Free Culture
Movement is Habermasian.”215
A more detailed discussion of the relationship between the public domain and
the public sphere can be found in Debora J. Halbert’s 2005 book “Resisting Intel-
lectual Property,” where she wrote that “a viable public sphere only exists when
a vibrant public domain exists.”216 Halbert is also the one to have embedded
the Mickunian public domain into the public domain discourse. To Halbert, a
strong public domain is a prerequisite of a public sphere. “People draw from
culture generally,” Halbert wrote, “to create their understanding of the world and
to communicate with others.” Halbert:
As people interact with each other using shared cultural images they begin
to form publics, a process that we can only hope will help to solidify democ-
racy. Democracy is built upon shared publics and shared culture; the public
sphere must not be understood as only the exchange of political information,
but instead the development of cultural connections.217
This is similar to the theory of participation that was extracted from Benjamin,
but it also incorporates a view on the space in which the encounter between
the work of art and its audience takes place. Thus, the public sphere can, at
least to a certain degree, be said to be the location of the encounter between
the work of art and its audience, but only if the encounter is participatory. As the
basic argument has been that “autonomous freedom implies a life under freely
posited, debated, and rationally examined rules,”218 a consumptive encounter
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between the work of art and its audience, in which the meaning is presented to
the audience, does not qualify as a Mickunian public domain.
What is seen as a corruption of the participatory encounter into a comsumptive
encounter, then, is the background for Halbert’s acknowledgement of the fact
that the idea of a public sphere can just as well be used to “serve the purposes
of a powerful elite.” As a result of this, “a conceptual battle to gain control over
the idea of the public sphere must be fought.”219




The fourth part of my thesis is about the realisation of the potential created
through deconstruction and anchoring. What I mean by this is that the frag-
ments left in the wake of the deconstructive phase of the debate were combined
with the “new” concepts and theories from the anchoring phase to form what in
the mid-2000s can be said to have reached a level of complexity that can be
described as a comprehensive social theory on the public domain. On top of
this descriptive social theory, moreover, a normative politics on free culture and
immaterial rights was put together. This “realisation” is a theoretical reconstruc-
tion of words and conceptions used within the intellectual property discourse, as
well as in the context of information and knowledge in general, aimed at consol-
idating a social theory on the nature and role of the public domain. Inasmuch as
this process included poaching a number of insights from other theories and dis-
courses to extend the analytic sophistication and credibility of the theories on the
public domain, the debate was detached from the realm of law, and new argu-
ments were developed conforming to the structure of other frames of references,
e.g., aesthetics, economics, and politics.
Consequently, the fourth phase of the public domain debate did not only encom-
pass a negative argument about how the public domain should be, in Lange’s
words, recognised as a “field of individual rights fully as important as any of the
new property rights.”220 In addition to this, namely, it encompassed a positive
argument about the need to protect and strengthen the public domain. Indeed,
the normative argument went from “resistance” to “advocacy.” In the first and
second phase of the debate, the normative arguments were usually posited as
criticism of excessive intellectual property rights. In the fourth phase, however,
the typical normative argument did not necessarily mention intellectual property
at all. Rather, the object of the argument was the public domain itself, which was
220Lange, “Recognizing the Public Domain”, p. 178.
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endorsed for nothing less than being essential to the constitution of the society
in which we live.
As mentioned, the two last phases of the debate are not as clear-cut as the
first two phases. Actually, it could be argued that they are both a part of a
“reconstructive phase.” I have chosen to separate the two, however, because
anchoring and realisation are two distinct schemes, and because it makes the
exposition of the public domain debate more intelligible. In the following I am
therefore going to write about arguments and analyses that have already been
described in Part III, but in this part I will write about them in the context of a
realisation of these insights as parts of a comprehensive social theory of public
domain.
I will begin my description of the fourth phase of the debate with a discussion
about how the public domain discourse was detached from a jurisprudential
frame of reference in the context of James Boyle’s notion of “cultural environ-
mentalism.” Then I will turn to how the argument on the public domain was
detached from a utilitarian discourse, especially in the context of the analysis
delineated in Lange’s 2001 article “Reimagining the Public Domain,” before I
end with a discussion on the argument that the public domain is constitutive of
society itself.
The Grazing Land of the Apprentice
According to Boyle in his 1997 article “A Politics of Intellectual Property — En-
vironmentalism for the Net?”, the environment and the public domain have a lot
in common. Both the environment and the public domain are fragile, they are
endangered, and their market value tend to be lower than their value to soci-
ety. Boyle therefore compared the few and rather narrow normative arguments
in favour of the public domain at the time of writing the article with the beginning
of the environmental movement in the 1950s and 1960s,221 and called for an
221James Boyle, “A Politics of Intellectual Property - Environmentalism for the Net?”, Duke Law
Journal 47, 1997, p. 108.
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immaterial double to the preservationist movement of the physical environment
— a “cultural environmentalism.”222
Just like in the context of the natural environment, in which supporters of the
park system, hunters, and birdwatchers are groups of people who care about is-
sues similar enough for them to join forces, both start-up software engineers, li-
braries, appropriationist artists, parodists, biographers, and biotech researchers
care, according to Boyle, about issues that shares enough features to be labelled
cultural environmentalism issues. In 1997, however, they had not realised this
common interest yet because the movement for the preservation of the public
domain lacked a theoretical framework for such a “perception of common inter-
est among disparate groups.”223 To Boyle, there was a theoretical gap in the
preservationist movement of the cultural environment.
Based, mostly, on the critique of the romantic notion of authorship, the preser-
vationist movement of the cultural environment already had something resem-
bling the ecological analysis of the fragile relationship between organisms and
their physical surroundings. At the same time, it can be argued that an eco-
nomic analysis was already present. At least partially, Grossman and Stiglitz’
analysis of the impossibility of informationally efficient markets and the ensuing
tradition of information economics can be seen as an economic justification for
the public domain. Moreover, insights from welfare economics can, to a certain
degree, also be applied to an analysis of the immaterial environment. After all,
it was the combination of the ecological analysis of the fragility of the environ-
ment with the disclosure of the manner in which welfare economics revealed
ways “markets can fail to make economic actors internalize the full costs of their
actions”224 that showed how the prevailing economic and legal system system-
atically emphasised private property at the expense of the surrounding environ-
ment. Boyle: “Markets would routinely fail to make economic actors internalize
their own costs, particularly their own environmental costs. This failure would
routinely disrupt or destroy fragile ecological systems, with unpredictable, ugly,
dangerous, and possibly irreparable consequences.”225 This could just as well
have been a description of the cultural environment.
From the fact that there existed no preservationist movement for the public do-
main in 1997 it is clear that the theoretical framework was not substantial enough,
222Actually, he did not introduce the expression “cultural environmentalism” in 1997. Rather,
the label was later used as a name for the concept he described as a “politics of intellectual
property” and an “environmentalism for the net.”
223Boyle, “A Politics of Intellectual Property - Environmentalism for the Net?”, p. 108.
224Ibid., p. 109.
225Ibid., p. 109.
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as Boyle argued. Either that, or the only explanation would be that Boyle’s anal-
ysis was wrong. After all, Boyle overlooked the lack of a “Silent Spring” in the
context of the cultural environment, meaning a damascene event that transforms
the public opinion. I am not only talking about Rachel Carson’s influential 1962
essay and book “Silent Spring,” but the actual silence that was experienced by
people in general because birds did die.
A Politics of Intellectual Property
When Boyle wrote that “we have no politics of intellectual property in the way that
we have a politics of the environment”226 in 1997, he displayed a bias toward an
intellectual property discourse. The debate thus seemed to have stalled within a
jurisprudential frame of reference. After all, he called for a politics of intellectual
property, not a politics of the public domain or the cultural environment.
As mentioned in Part II, this bias was typical for both the first and second phase
of the public domain debate. Both Lange, Litman, and Boyle — in his 1992
article “A Theory of Law and Information” — studied the public domain within
the context of copyright and patent law. Hettinger, on the other hand, did argue
within a philosophical and moral frame of reference, but intellectual property law
still had a paramount role in his argument.
In light of Boyle’s book “Shamans, Software, and Spleens,” however, it is still
surprising that he used the words “a politics of intellectual property” as late as
1997. After all, “Shamans” was written in 1996, and in it, Boyle argued clearly
and positively in favour of a strong public domain in a more comprehensive way
than what had been done before him. The basic argument was still similar to Lit-
man’s argument that the public domain should be seen “as a device that permits
the rest of the system to work by leaving the raw material of authorship available
for authors to use,”227 but in addition to this, he did two things: (1) He discussed
both utilitarian, economic, aesthetic, and moral approaches toward the public do-
main; and (2) he continued Hettinger’s incorporation of patent law, although he
also wrote about the public domain in connection with other information issues
like blackmail and insider trading.
Even so, the negative, intellectual property-focused approach can still be iden-
tified. Instead of arguing that the public domain is necessary for the creation
of new knowledge and information — without mentioning intellectual property at
226Ibid., p. 89.
227Litman, “The Public Domain”, p. 968.
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all — Boyle questioned the fairness of intellectual property. To justify intellec-
tual property, Boyle argued, it is necessary “to give a moral justification of the
fact that the individual is being granted a private monopoly rent for recombining
language, genre, and ideas that were harvested free of charge from the pub-
lic domain.”228 This argument is clearly different from the earlier arguments in
that he questioned the justification of intellectual property rather than criticise
copyright law as a threat to the public domain. Nevertheless, his focus was still
intellectual property.
Utilitarianism with an Economic Yardstick
The typical argument in place when Boyle introduced the notion of a preserva-
tionist movement of the cultural environment, namely that the public domain is,
using Hyde’s words, “a grazing land of the apprentice,” is perhaps best described
as utilitarian. This is unsurprising, as one of the most important justifications of
intellectual property is also utilitarian. This utilitarianism is, in a sense, eco-
nomic. By this I do not mean that they employ economic models to calculate the
answer, but that they measure the effectiveness in economic terms. As such, it
is a utilitarianism with an economic yardstick.
Arguably, at least some of the reason for the widespread application of utilitarian
arguments in this period can be found in the predominance of marketisation in
the 1980s and 1990s. The only argument that seemed to stick was the argu-
ment on economic efficiency. It is hard to appraise “culture,” however, and the
argument was readily reduced to a simplistic “more.” The core of the argument
was therefore that the public domain is needed because it makes it possible
to create “more.” As a simplified argument on economic efficiency the aim to
create “more” is mostly unspecified, but it is similar to the the aim of a general
usefulness to society which is the core of the Copyright Clause in the American
constitution, namely “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”229
Jack Valenti’s argument about the public domain work being an orphan belongs
to such a utilitarian discourse:
A public domain work is an orphan. No one is responsible for its life. But
everyone exploits its use, until that time certain when it becomes soiled and
haggard, barren of its previous virtues. Who, then, will invest the funds to
renovate and nourish its future life when no one owns it?230
228Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens, p. 97.
229The Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8.
230Jack Valenti in Ochoa, “Origins and Meanings of the Public Domain”, p. 256.
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Similar to the negative view of the public domain as something works “fall” into
from the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Valenti paints a
picture of the public domain as what could perhaps be called a “Grim Reaper
of culture.” Counter to the view of people like Lange, Litman, and Boyle, Valenti
claims that public domain reduce the “amount” of culture, because no one is
“responsible for its life.”
A critique of the notions inherent in this “Grim Reaper Narrative” can be found
in Drahos’ 1996 book “A Philosophy of Intellectual Property.” To Drahos, an ex-
tension of intellectual property may “provide individuals with strong incentives to
act in non-preservationist ways when it comes to the intellectual commons,” and,
moreover, to “to appropriate the commons or prevent abstract objects from mak-
ing it into the commons.” This may cause “a reversal of the economist’s common
pool problem” to take place.231 To Drahos, the public domain may end up as “a
hunting ground for the economically strong and the technologically capable.”232
This argument belongs to the same utiliarian framework of reference.
Benkler’s analysis of commons-based peer production, which I described in Part
III, is similar to this utilitarian argument, but broader and more extensive. In-
deed, in his 2007 “follow-up” article on the preservationist movement, “Cultural
Environmentalism and Beyond,” Boyle described Benkler’s 2006 “Wealth of Net-
works” as the beginnings of “a more sophisticated normative, economic, and an-
thropological notion of commons-based production.”233 Even though Benkler’s
analysis was clearly more comprehensive than earlier analyses, however, it was
still mainly utilitarian. A more pronounced political argument can be found in
Lange’s analysis of the public domain as a state, not a location, which I turn to
now.
Citizenship of the Creative Imagination
In 1968, Benjamin Kaplan wrote that “I reflected that if a man has any ’natural’
rights, not the least must be a right to imitate his fellows, and thus to reap where
he has not sown.”234 This “right” has been present throughout the entire modern
debate on the public domain, if not as explicit all the time. As discussed in Part I,
Lange picked up this rights-based approach in his 1981 article “Recognizing the
231Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property , p. 67.
232Ibid., p. 67.
233James Boyle, “Cultural Environmentalism and Beyond”, Law and Contemporary Problems
70, 2007, p. 21.
234Kaplan, “An Unhurried View of Copyright”, p. 2.
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Public Domain.” It was revisited, however, in Lange’s 2001 article “Reimagining
the Public Domain.” In it, Lange introduced the notion of a “citizenship of the
creative imagination.”
In connection with the Duke Conference on the Public Domain in 2001, Lange
wrote an update of his 1981 article “Recognizing the Public Domain.” In the 2001
article “Reimagining the Public Domain,” Lange first adorned the established cri-
tique of the negative understanding of the public domain through an analogy with
an African veldt. “Imagine an African veldt,” Lange wrote, “where lions and jack-
als and gazelles dwell in uneasy symbiosis while the merciless sun shines down
dispassionately upon them.”235 The veldt is a metaphor for all the information
and knowledge that exists, and the animals on the veldt — or the different kinds
of information and knowledge — lives in a symbiosis. Nevertheless, Lange ar-
gued, it does not require much imagination to recognise these inhabitants of the
veldt as separate species. Avoiding such a recognition is a sort of taxonomical
cowardliness: “You have to be a lion- or jackal-lover of truly limited imagination
or unlimited commitment to argue that gazelles are to be understood as no more
than whatever is left over after their adversaries have finished feeding.”236
We recognise much of this argument in Litman’s and Boyle’s writings, and so it
is unsurprising that Lange closes this introduction by asserting that his project
is “to recognize gazelles as gazelles—and not merely to recognize them, but
to give them the means with which to defend themselves against their natural
enemies.”237 What he did was to suggest a conceptual change in our under-
standing of what the public domain is. Rather than being a place (“a wilderness,
a commons, a sanctuary, a home”), Lange argued that the public domain should
be conceived as status. This status is similar to citizenship, but, Lange wrote,
“a ’citizenship’ arising from the exercise of creative imagination rather than as a
concomitant of birth,”238 i.e. “a citizenship of the creative imagination.” Lange:
Imagine the public domain as a status that arises from the exercise of the
creative imagination, thus to confer entitlements, privileges and immunities
in the service of that exercise; a status independently and affirmatively rec-
ognized in law, sometimes collective in nature and sometimes individual,
but omnipresent, portable and defining; and a status meanwhile paramount
to whatever inconsistent status may be conferred upon a work of authorship
(or its author) from time to time, whether that work is protected as intellec-






tual property, or is included within a so-called liability regime, or is otherwise
provided for.239
Even though Lange begins his article with a discussion on the traditional take
on the public domain, his analysis is different from the utilitarian approach. To
Lange, the public domain is valuable for more than its ability to insure production,
and his argument goes beyond a mere conservation of the public domain to a
recognition of the rights everyone have in this cultural commons. Moreover,
this recognition of the rights of everyone signal the aesthetic expansion of art
into something we all participate in. Lange did not only refer to the necessity
of making sure that artists have access to the public domain as raw material.
Rather, he advocates everyone’s rights in the public domain both for political
and aesthetic reasons. It is this political and aesthetic analysis I turn to now.
Thespian Reality
In 1996, Peter Drahos wrote that “decisions about who is to have rights of access
and use of the intellectual commons are decisions that are constitutive of com-
munity (My italics).”240 Contrary to the first phase of the public domain debate,
in which the public domain was discussed almost exclusively within a jurispru-
dential frame of reference, Drahos’ claim that decisions regarding intellectual
commons are “constitutive of community” places the public domain in a much
larger context. Even though Boyle briefly touched upon this as early as in 1992
when he wrote that “it is hard to repress an occasional wish to frame the issue
as whether a specific type of regulation will help or hinder the kind of society that
we wish to create,”241 Drahos’ book was an early instance of such a constitutive
approach. It was not until the 2000s equally comprehensive studies of the role
of the public domain became common.
The notion that something is constitutive of society itself is certainly not unique
to the public domain discourse. One example is the argument that the introduc-
tion of wristwatches and pocket watches influenced the society in a fundamental
239Ibid., p. 474.
240Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property , p. 59.
241Boyle, “A Theory of Law and Information”, p. 1525.
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manner. Another example is the argument that cell phones and ceaseless con-
nectivity has altered the makeup of human association. This form of societal
adaptation is also comparable to Karl Polanyi’s analysis of the transformation of
traditional society into a market society. To Polanyi, a market organisation of the
economic system will by necessity bring about a market society. The economy
is not embedded in social relations. Rather, “social relations are embedded in
the economic system.” The economic system is superior to social relations:
Once the economic system is organized in separate institutions, [...] soci-
ety must be shaped in such a manner as to allow that system to function
according to its laws. This is the meaning of the familiar assertion that a
market economy can function only in a market society.242
A market organisation is therefore “contagious” or “viral” in that it expands by
reorganising other parts of society based on its own structure. A similar notion
of the contagiousness, and, hence, superiority, of such “low-level principles” can
be found in Lawrence Lessig’s 2004 book “Free Culture.” To Lessig, a free cul-
ture “supports and protects creators and innovators.”243 The opposite of such a
free culture is a “permission culture,” in which you must get permission before
you can create. According to Lessig, intellectual property law has operated as
such a superior low-level principle in transforming the culture into a permission
culture. This argument is comparable to Vaidhyanathan’s argument about the
correspondence between the collapse of the Habermasian public sphere and
the development of copyright, which I discussed toward the end of Part III. Vaid-
hyanathan did not argue that the collapse of the Habermasian public sphere was
brought about by expansions of copyright alone. Rather, he argued that the cor-
ruptions of copyright “have enforced, and been enforced by,” the disintegration
of the public sphere.244
In line with this, Halbert argued that “the public sphere of the eighteenth century
was possible because the circulation of texts remained relatively free from copy-
right.”245 It is therefore likely that Halbert would agree to Lessig’s argument that
“freedom from copyright,” which can be interpreted as the presence of a strong
public domain, can also act as a contagious and superior low-level principle. But
this principle, the argument goes, transforms the culture into a free culture.
A free culture cannot be legislated, however, or intentionally decided in any other
way. Law can only enable the creation of a free culture, not actually create it.
242Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001 (1944)), p. 60.
243Lessig, Free Culture, p. xiv.
244Vaidhyanathan, Copyright and Copywrongs, p. 6.
245Halbert, Resisting Intellectual Property , p. 23.
Thespian Reality 87
The public domain is therefore not unconditionally a superior low-level principle,
which Vaidhyanathan recognised when he wrote “have enforced, and been en-
forced by.” Moreover, a view of the public domain as an enabler is similar to
the notion underlying Mickunas’ argument about founding a democratic commu-
nity, which “is not an activity of the past, done once and for all by the so-called
founders but must be constantly maintained by every citizen.”246 The argument
is therefore put forward that being a participant in a free culture rather than a
spectator in a permission culture not only influences one’s experience of culture,
but affect the society itself.
If participation potentially changes the culture itself, human beings must have
the capacity to alter the society in which we live. At the same time, the con-
stitution of our culture must have the capacity to shape our lives. This is the
reason people like Lethem, Benkler, and Boyle focus so much on the process of
deconstruction. In his 2007 essay “Ecstasy of Influence,” for instance, Lethem
argued that the participation of the observer promotes the process of revealing
or uncovering what was ultimately described better with words written by Boyle,
despite the fact that Boyle did not write them about participation, namely “that
which is suppressed or rendered invisible by the overwhelming familiarity of our
social arrangements.”247
Benkler acknowledged this reciprocity of our power to change our culture and our
culture’s power to change us in more detail when he wrote (1) that “culture oper-
ates as a set of background assumptions and common knowledge that structure
our understanding of the state of the world and the range of possible actions
and outcomes open to us individually and collectively,”248 and (2) that “culture is
manipulable, manageable,” and that there seems to exist “a direct locus of inten-
tional action aimed precisely at harnessing its force as a way of controlling the
lives of those who inhabit it.”249
This analysis of free culture, based on the superiority of contagious low-level
principles, participation, and the influence of the culture we create, is the philo-
sophical foundation for the comprehensive social theory on the public domain
I will write about in the last part of this chapter. Because this was still very
much a work in progress in 2007, my description of this theory can only be a
rough sketch. I have also chosen to restrict my account to Lessig, Benkler, and
Lethem, although I have included a few references to an earlier article on infor-
246Mickunas, “The Public Domain”, p. 179.
247Boyle, “A Theory of Law and Information”, p. 1423.
248Benkler, The Wealth of Networks, p. 297.
249Ibid., p. 298.
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mation in the digital age by John Perry Barlow and a book on “public domain” in
the context of the theater by Richard Schechner. I turn to this now.
“Tinkering,” in its original sense, is to try to repair or improve something, mostly
something mechanical, and more often than not with no useful effect. Starting
from the early 2000s, however, the word was used to denote playing around
in a more general sense, especially on computers. The computer scientist Ed
Felten spoke about a “Freedom to Tinker,” because tinkering, in his opinion,
is an important aspect of technology and understanding in general. He even
called for a constitutional right to tinker. On Felten’s blog “Freedom to Tinker,”
the expression is defined as “your freedom to understand, discuss, repair, and
modify the technological devices you own.”250
A freedom to tinker is essential to commons-based peer production. If “every
good work of software starts by scratching a developer’s personal itch,”251 as
Raymond put it, no good software will ever be created without freedom to tinker.
This is also important outside of software. In fact, it is the essence of incremental
innovation. The idea that the worker should be able to see and implement small
improvements in the production process depends upon the worker’s freedom to
play around. If every gadget, instrument, and machine was equipped with seals
of which breaking not only voids the guarantee but also infringe upon someone’s
intellectual property rights, this tinkering is impossible without breaking the law.
Both of these kinds of tinkering are examples of what I have called generative
participation, and they are both based on the belief that more people will find
better solutions, or, as Raymond put it: “Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are
shallow.”252
A similar kind of tinkering can be seen in Lessig’s argument about the educa-
tional value of playing around. Lessig’s example is a school project consisting of
buses filled up with video equipment which “enable [...] children to learn some-
thing about media by doing something with media. By doing, they think. By
tinkering, they learn.”253 YouTube is another example. Through YouTube, people
are allowed to play around with media images on their own. By tinkering, they
become “media literate.” To Lessig, it is important for children to understanding
the “grammar” of media: “For just as there is a grammar for the written word, so,
too, is there one for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of (at least at
250Freedom to Tinker. http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com (February 19, 2009)
251Raymond, “The Cathedral and the Bazaar”.
252Ibid.
253Lessig, Free Culture, p. 35.
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first) terrible media.”254 Consequently, if all kinds of media are off limits, and it is
illegal to “rip, mix, burn,” tinkering is, again, impossible without breaking the law.
Tinkering, its connotations notwithstanding, is therefore comparable to participa-
tion. But tinkering is not only important with respect to technology and media. It
is important for every aspect of a self-conscious culture. This kind of tinkering is
only possible, however, if the content of culture is available. Based on an appre-
ciation of tinkering an argument on the value of the public domain is therefore
put forth. For, as Lessig wrote, “the law and, increasingly, technology, interfere
with a freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.”255 The
argument is, as I wrote in the introduction, that we are at a loss as a society
without the right to imitate, plagiarise, criticise and satirise. Lethem used Steve
Erickson’s words and wrote: “We’re surrounded by signs; our imperative is to
ignore none of them.”256 The public domain is the core of this analysis. It is
impossible to imitate and criticise, it is argued, if it is illegal to reuse.
Up until this point, most of that which had been said about the public domain had
been general, and not dependent on the development of the internet. Certainly,
internet had influenced the analyses, and perhaps even caused the analyses to
be made. But the recognition of creativity as derivative and the argument that
“the only way to make gray is to mix black and white,”257 was posited irrespective
of the existence of digitisation. An argument in favour of a strong public domain
has also been made, however, based on the role of the public domain in a digital
era. The rest of this chapter is about this argument
“Popular music did not begin with Elvis,” Benkler wrote. “There has always been
a folk culture—of music, storytelling, and theater.”258 But this culture was not
“static” in the way modern culture is. “An oral tradition quite naturally takes its
shape from the changing culture which transmits it,” Schechner wrote, “a written
tradition, however, trends to solidify and become reactionary.”259 There was no
“final cut” in the ancient human societies. Barlow:
Because there was never a moment when the story was frozen in print, the
so-called ’moral’ right of storytellers to own the tale was neither protected
254Ibid., p. 36.
255Ibid., p. 47.
256Lethem, “The ecstasy of influence - A plagiarism”, p. 63.
257Sunder, “IP3”, p. 306.
258Benkler, The Wealth of Networks, p. 295.
259Richard Schechner, Public Domain, (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1969),
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nor recognized. The story simply passed through each of them on its way
to the next, where it would assume a different form.260
To Barlow, this role of information corresponded to the nature of information.
“Information wants to be free,” Barlow wrote. It “is the pitch, not the baseball, the
dance, not the dancer.”261 Intellectual property rights must therefore be seen in
light of the development of “containers.” It is unsurprising, then, that copyright
was introduced shortly after the main “container” — the book — was invented. It
was unimaginable before.
Digitisation was certainly novel, but at the same time, it is argued, digitisation
recreated something that had been lost. With the internet and digital media,
Barlow argued, our culture was returning to the continuous information flow of
the traditional society. Just as in an “oral tradition, digitized information has no
’final cut.”’262 Barlow continued: “The stories which once shaped our sense of
the world didn’t have authoritative versions. They adapted to each culture in
which they found themselves being told.”263 To Barlow, then, culture is just as
malleable and plastic as it is to Benkler, Boyle, and Lethem. Moreover, culture
is language — “the basic framework within which we can comprehend anything,
and through which we do so everywhere.”264
As I mentioned when I wrote about Mickunas and the “Mickunian” public domain
in Part III, some of the most interesting cases of anchoring are when the term
“public domain” is actually used verbatim within the external discourse, but not
necessarily in the Langean sense. A second example of this is Schechner’s
1969 book “Public Domain — Essays on the Theatre.” Contrary to Mickunas,
Schechner did brifly mention the Langean public domain, but the “public domain”
Schechner writes about is predominantly the public nature of the theatre. To
my knowledge, Schechner has not been used within the modern debate on the
public domain. But his argument on the theatre as public art summarises the
“finishing touch” of the social theory on the public domain that can be spotted in
the last papers I have written about, i.e. work by Lessig, Benkler, and Lethem,
very well. I will therefore conclude my exposition of the modern debate on the
public domain by laying out what I will label the “schechnerian” argument on the
value of public domain, as it is discernable in papers published in the mid-2000s.
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Schechner compared the modern theatre with traditional theatres, much like Bar-
low compared the emerging digitilised culture with an oral tradition. While “our”
theatre is entertainment, “an amusement, a pasttime, a relief from drudgery,
play,” theatre in traditional culture is reality: “The theatre is a natural way to cel-
ebrate birth, puberty, marriage, the acquisition or transmission of public power,
and death; to commemorate house-building, planting, harvest; to retell events of
national importance and personal terror and joy.”265 Lessig’s example was ed-
ucation, but the role of tinkering is much wider. The public domain is the stage
on which we live our lives. It is where we share, tinker, and participate. But if
we have no access to public domain, then it is impossible to participate. The
alternative is to be the audience to a stageplay were our lives are being played
out in front of us, and, possibly, amuse ourselves to death.
To Schechner, then, modern theatre is characterised by consumption of some-
one else’s creation, while traditional culture is characterised by participation,
both interpretive and generative. In this view, the separation between idea and
expression caused culture to coagulate and thicken. Schechner: “We have come
to believe that ideas are something separate from the action—something that
can be ’carried’ or ’transmitted’ by the action. In many other parts of the world,
the action is the idea.”266 Similar to the core argument in the public domain de-
bate and analogous to Lethem, Lessig, and Benkler, Schechner thus argued that
the “most creative ages of theatre were those in which plagiarism flourished.”267
To Schechner, theatre would not find its strength again until “we remove the texts
of plays from the straitjacket of copyright.”268
The same optimism that can be seen in some of the contributions to the modern
debate on the public domain, especially in Benkler, can therefore be spotted
in Schechner. To Schechner, we are all, or at least can be, a part of a thespian
reality in which we play out our lives as a society. Schechner: “After participating
in theatre (as performer or spectator) one sees and understands experience
differently.”269







As I wrote in the introduction, the substantive problem which provided the orien-
tation for this study was that of making intelligible what appeared to be a recur-
ring pattern of attitudes toward public domain and the value of common access
to knowledge and information on the part of American law scholars in the 1980s
and 1990s, and how this pattern spread into other disciplines to form a social
theory on public domain by the mid-2000s. It has been my argument that this
social theory has become the analytical framework underlying the debate about
the last few years’ rather explosive development seen in the nature and signif-
icance of what I have called “participatory internet.” To understand the debate
on phenomenons like Wikipedia, YouTube, blogs, social networking sites, and
peer-to-peer file sharing, I believe it is necessary to look closer at the intellectual
history of the public domain.
The traditional view of the traditional view of the public domain, so to speak,
has been that the public domain traditionally had been seen as the flip side of
intellectual property. Looking closer, however, this was not necessarily the case.
As I have shown, examples of positive recognition of the value of public domain
have been numerous. Between John Donne, Joseph Yates, John Dalrymple,
Lord Camden, Justice Story, Justice Brandeis, and Northrop Frye, there is ample
evidence of that. Still, none of these arguments on the value of availability have
been a positive recognition of the value of the public domain, meaning a legally
defined collection of information and knowledge that is available for all to use
at their own discretion. Rather, they have all been an acknowledgement of the
value of availability in general.
It would be more correct to say that the public domain traditionally had not been
seen as under threat in the same way as it was perceived to be in the 1980s
and 1990s. As such, my “numerous” examples could be interpreted as occa-
sional and infrequent utterings of the self-evident. Such a claim would be rash,
of course, but there is something to it. Contrary to the traditional view of the tradi-
tional view of the public domain, as I have called it, there seems to have been an
obviousness related to the public domain that was gone in the 1960s and 1970s.
When William Krasilovsky articulated the flip side-definition of public domain in
1967, his view should perhaps be seen as an attempt to grasp the new role of
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the public domain prompted by the new situation of intellectual property law in
the 1960s. A brief comparison with William Carman’s 1954 article “The Func-
tion of the Judge and Jury” illustrates this development. There seems to have
been a sense of obviousness inherent in the way Carman argued about what
he called the public commons. To Carman, a justification for public domain was
unnecessary. Self-assured but not arrogant, he wrote that ideas were “universal
heritage” which under no circumstance should be allowed to be appropriated by
private individuals.
My argument is not that this self-evidence is all there is to say about the “old”
view of the public domain, or that it was unchanged throughout the seventeenth,
eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries. Camden’s words “fourteen
Years is too long a Privilege for their perishable Trash,” from the 1774 House of
Lords case Donaldson v. Beckett, is more than enough proof of disagreement
about issues related to public domain. Rather, it is my opinion that a positive
recognition of the value of the public domain did not appear with the emergence
of the modern debate on the public domain. It was much older than that, which
is why I have argued that the traditional take on the intellectual history of the
public domain, curiously, has failed to acknowledge the “old” in all the “new.”
There remains to be said something about the reason for all of this, however. The
modern debate on the public domain did not emerge from emptiness. It was the
result of a number of changes in society in general. The most immediate source
— or spark — was clearly changes in copyright law. But the changes in copyright
law can themselves be seen as a result of the more general tendencies that later
influenced the public domain debate directly. In my view, the most significant
“triggers” and “intensifiers,” meaning something that has both helped initiate the
debate and continued to stimulate the debate, are major technological changes,
changes in intellectual property law directly affecting the public domain, and what
I might be so bold as to call the radicalisation of prolonged political trends.
“From the Photocopier to the iPod” would have been a nice title for a discussion
on the technological revolution of the last half of the twentieth century. While a
regular guy in the late nineteenth century more or less would have to travel to
a city and pay a lot of money to be able to print something on paper, any 10-
year-old today can choose between a wide range of options, usually including
printing it at school, at one of his parents’ workplace, at a friends’ place, or at
home. If she wanted to print it on paper at all. After all, she could just as easily
publish the text on a web site, or email it to her teacher. In the movie “Love
Actually,” Hugh Grant’s character says that “love, actually, is all around.” This is
94 Free as Air to Common Use — Conclusion
certainly no less true for information. In the movie “Information Actually,” the little,
squeaky animal that always accompany the main character in Disney animations
is therefore likely to say that “information, actually, is all around.”
It is interesting to note that most of the contributions to the public domain de-
bate have been on public domain in general, despite the fact that they were
at least partially motivated by digitisation. The advent of internet has certainly
made the issues more pressing, but most of the arguments, especially in the first
phases, were actually equally valid for culture both online and offline. It is there-
fore imaginable that a public domain discourse could have arisen even without
the internet, sparked only by changes in intellectual property law. But it would
not have been as momentous.
Intellectual property law has never been as extensive as in the late twentieth
century, neither in scope nor in strength. Expansions of copyright term length,
introduction of process patents, patentability of microorganisms, and, especially,
the globalisation of western-style intellectual property rights through the Trips-
agreement, have all increased the immediacy of infringement. As both Lawrence
Lessig and James Boyle have argued, it used to be hard to violate copyright. It
was close to impossible to infringe inadvertently. With new technology such as
photocopiers, video recorders, compact cassettes, and, not least, computers
and mp3-players, it is hard to get through a whole day without infringing.
Both technological changes and expansions of intellectual property law have
continually triggered reactions and countermovements, which has kindled the
study of the public domain. In addition to this, marketisation has both supported
the expansions of intellectual property and been an analytical challenge to the
study of public domain. To the neoliberalist, it seems as if inspiration has no
value. The muses are as dead as God was dead to Nietzsche. Just as the
Age of Reason and modernity put an end to faith in a theistic cosmic order and
Nietzsche claimed that God is “dead” because God is a myth, a neoliberalist
would probably claim that the Muses are Dead because the existence of Muses
is a myth. The result is that the value of the inspiration of the “author” and the
raw material he uses is consistently downplayed.
The relationship between the phrases “God is Dead” and “The Muses are Dead”
is stronger than merely being analogies. The establishment of intellectual prop-
erty rights is firmly related to the individualism of modernity. Recognising the
“author” as the single proprietor of a work could hardly have happened in Antiq-
uity or the Middle Ages. Moreover, the muses are just as dead to a marxist as to
a neoliberalist. The rejection of divine inspiration is a faustian trait of modernity
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as a whole, which is why I have argued that the modern debate on the public do-
main has been instigated by the radicalisation of some of the traits recognised
in the more general political trends belonging to modernity.
When the participants in the modern debate on the public domain searched for
arguments that would back their claims as to the value of accessilibity and reuse,
they therefore found a wellspring of reasoning in the critique of both marketisa-
tion and modernity. Through deconstruction of notions inherent in intellectual
property law that were seen as precluding an accurate understanding of the
public domain, an embedding of new concepts by anchoring their use of the
concepts to the external discourses the concepts originated in, and a realisation
of the potential created by these processes, a social theory of public domain
was constructed. Not the public domain, meaning a narrow, legally defined are
of knowledge and information strictly separated from both creative commons and
intellectual property rights, but public domain, meaning a broad understanding
of, using Benkler’s words, “sharing nicely.”
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, then, outlines, preliminary notions, and com-
ponents to a social theory on public domain were brought to the table. My ar-
gument is that all the elements necessary to create such a theory had been
presented by the mid-2000s, even though it had not reached the level where
it was possible, as Frye would have said, to write “an elementary textbook ex-
pounding its fundamental principle.” The modern debate on the public domain
has had no “Silent Spring,” and no “Communist Manifesto” has been written. But
a shared understanding of the value of public domain was evident. The desired
transformation of our culture is the transformation from a “cut and paste culture,”
where actors such as Disney is allowed to cut out and remove art and knowl-
edge from our common culture, to a “copy and paste culture,” where actors such
as Kutiman and Alice Randall are allowed to copy from our common culture to
create more. The work of art is not brought to life by creative genius working in
isolation, it is argued, but as a patchwork or a bricolage of human life.
The core of this social theory is the value of reuse. But not only to insure pro-
duction. Reuse is important because art reusing other’s art is seen as more
beautiful; because the organisation of society will improve the more people are
allowed to participate in the political processes; and because reuse is more effi-
cient economically speaking — or should everybody invent their own wheels?
Based on Benjamin’s dichotomy of the passive absorber of meaning and the
active participant in society, we can deduce a corresponding dichotomy of the
function of art in society: The mechanically reproduced work of art can either be
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a tool to suppress a community (if people are passive absorbers), or an instru-
ment able to uncover wrongful assumptions (if people are active participants).
To Lethem, however, the question of which of these two is the correct is not an
empirical one, but a question of social policy. To people like Lethem and Lessig,
the function of art in a permission culture is as a tool to suppress a community,
while the function of art in a free culture is as an instrument able to uncover
wrongful assumptions.
If we are not allowed to reuse, the argument goes, we will not be able to under-
stand the culture we are a part of. As early as 1967, Benjamin Kaplan wrote
that “education, after all, proceeds from a kind of mimicry, and ’progress,’ if it is
not entirely an illusion, depends on generous indulgence of copying.”270 Not only
do we learn about technology by playing around with gadgets, we learn about
everything by playing around with, well, everything. Just as we learn about liter-
ature by writing our own (bad) prose, we learn about music by trying to play a
guitar or sing a song. We learn about images by playing around with cameras
and camcorders; we learn about technology by playing around with gadgets; we
learn about society by playing around with each other.
Imagine a child that never quite mastered the black and white keys of a piano, but
learned how music is created. Or the students of international relations learn-
ing about the United Nations through role-playing games emulating the security
council. In school, children demystify the theatrics of theater by enacting their
own stageplays and conquer the stage themselves. In the same “Love Actually,”
the children insists that there should be an octopus in the nativity play. To them,
the nativity play is within their grasp. They can change it. It is rewritable. They
are not passive consumers of a culture created in a studio far away, they are
participants of their own society.
Curiously, even the story about Faust has been written by three separate, mod-
ern authors — retold a thousand times. When Andrew Lipton and Daniuel Shiu
recreated Escher’s 1953 litography “Relativity” using Lego pieces in 2003, did
they infringe on Escher’s copyright or create a magnificent piece of art resem-
bling Escher’s “Relativity”? Was Kutiman’s collage merely a rip-off? Alice Ran-
dall’s novel a swindle? As Richard Schechner wrote, “there is a special beauty
in an art whose extraordinary complexity precludes a uniquely personal creativ-
ity.”271 It embodies humanity.
270Kaplan, “An Unhurried View of Copyright”, p. 2.
271Schechner, Public Domain, p. 201.
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